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LEGAL RESOLUTION OF DENIAL OF 
ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid expansion of technology has drawn the courts 
with increasing frequency into areas where their experience is 
limited. Issues surrounding the decisions of administrative agen-
cies involving the application of technologies such as nuclear en-
ergy and deoxyribonucleic acid recombinant technologies con-
tinue to be widely debated. Recognition of the court's role and 
limitations in proscribing applications of developing technologies 
is not new to science,l the judiciary,lII or the legislature.s 
Solutions to the democratic control of technology have 
ranged from Kantrowitz's suggestion that a "Science Court"· be 
created to resolve technologic disputes, to the creation of posi-
tions for scientific advisors to sit with judges and advise them 
regarding the scientific aspects bearing on a particular decision. II 
Although the question of financial constraints and the rele-
vant application of medical technology have been widely de-
bated by economists, and health planners in medical,S lay,' and 
legal publications,8 it is only recently that these issues have been 
raised in the context of an individual patient. Recent appeals on 
national network television for funding of liver and bone marrow 
transplantation for individual children have raised the issue to 
its quintessential form: Why are individual patients being de-
1. Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SCIENTIST 505 
(1975). 
2. Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. 
REv. 817 (1979). 
3. 113 CONGo REc. 15, 256 (1967). 
4. Kantrowitz, supra, note 1. 
5. Leventhal, Environmental Decision Making and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. 
PA. LAW REV. 550 (1974). 
6. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan, 298 N. ENGL. J. MED. 650 (1978). 
7. Dept. of Health, Educ. and Welfare, President Carter's National Health Plan 
Legislation; Detail Fact Sheet 5 (1979). 
8. Hamilton, Perspectives on Health Planning: A State View, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 535 
(1982); Note, Catastrophic Health Insurance and Cost Containment: Restructuring the 
Current Health Insurance System, 6 AM. J. L. & MED. 83 (1980). . 
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nied access to life-sustaining, possibly lifesaving, medical 
technology? 
The media has presented the issue as simply one of econom-
ics, but it is more than that. In the majority of cases, patients 
being denied access to medical technology have private or pub-
licly funded health insurance. While the basis of a medical 
center's refusal to treat the patient is entirely economic, such a 
refusal derives from a third-party payer decision to deny cover-
age. The purported basis for the denial of insurance coverage is 
not cost, but rather that the technology or the particular appli-
cation in question is experimental. The essence of the contro-
versy is: When is a particular technology or application no 
longer experimental? 
Although· these controversies require legal resolution, Jus-
tice Bazelon, discussing the need for administrative support, 
warned that the "substantive review of mathematical and scien-
tific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unre-
liable."9 The satisfactory resolution of specific controversies, as 
well as the generic issue, will require a judiciary and bar conver-
sant in the language of scientific medicine and familiar with the 
rudimentary principles of the scientific method. The latter need 
only comprise a basic understanding of the collection of scien-
tific data, bias exclusion through controls and "blinding," and 
the statistical analysis of results.10 
The legal issues involved in technology application are inex-
. tricably interwoven with the medical issues. This Comment will 
first discuss the general principles of the scientific method and 
then contrast their application to pharmacologic therapy with 
their application to technologic treatments. Bone marrow trans-
plantation will then be analyzed in depth, illustrating the medi-
cal issues that third-party payers consider in coverage decisions. 
Continuing with the model of bone marrow transplantation, this 
9. Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d I, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
941 (1976). 
10. A detailed review of statistics is beyond the scope of this Comment. Two of the 
current controversies in medicine turn on the adequacy of study design and statistical 
analysis. These controversies have not been resolved five and thirteen years after publi-
cation of the original work. See Reiman, The Anturane Reinfarction Trial: Reevaluation 
of Outcome, 306 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1005 (1982); Finestein, Clinical Failures and Fallacies 
of the UGDP Study, 19 CLIN. PHARMACOL. THEK. 78 (1976). 
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Comment will conclude with an analysis of legal solutions to the 
denial of access to medical technology. 
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND 
Legal relief for a patient denied access to medical technol-
ogy will require a demonstration that the particular technology 
or application is not experimental. This issue is unique to medi-
cal technology and has not come before the courts in litigation 
over medical pharmacologic treatments because of several differ-
ences in the manner in which a new drug is developed. The Fed-
eral Drug Administration (FDA) does not permit a new drug to 
be marketed until it is proven efficacious. The process is rigorous 
and FDA approval of a new drug or application usually assures 
physician acceptance. There is no similar regulation of medical 
technologies and, as a consequence, they may be widely used 
before any agreement is reached in the medical community as to 
the efficacy of the technology. Furthermore, the evaluation of a 
new drug is funded by the manufacturer. Thus, if a patient and 
his physician decide the benefit of treatment with an experimen-
tal drug justifies the risk,l1 that patient may receive such treat-
ment at a center which is evaluating the drug without charge to 
third-party payers for the experimental treatment. Consequent-
ly, litigation concerning experimental medications has been lim-
ited to attempts to force FDA approval of drugs which are in 
general use in other countries, but which have not been ade-
quately studied in the United States. 
Finally, the political pressures of the 1970's greatly influ-
enced the development of nascent biomedical technologies. 
Since the 1960's, Congress had provided seemingly unlimited 
funding for biomedical research. In the early 1970's, however, 
concerns arose over rising health care costs. Critics were quick to 
point out that, statistically, these increased costs were not re-
flected in improvements in health or health care. The biomedical 
research community responded to the critics with the explana-
tion that their discoveries were not being utilized sufficiently by 
the medical community. Therefrom sprang the soon-to-be-
cliched concept of "technology transfer." That term of art repre-
sents the idea that if the advances of biomedical research could 
11. Both the benefit and the risk, of course, may be unknown early in the investiga-
tion of a drug. 
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be disseminated to the practicing medical community, the bene-
fits soon would be reflected in improved national health statis-
tics. Even at the onset, testimony before congressional commit-
tees warned against the introduction of inadequately proven 
technologies and their expansion from areas' of known efficacy 
into unproven areas. 
Nevertheless, on November 8, 1978, President Carter signed 
Public Law 95-623 which created the National Center for Health 
Care Technology (NCHCT) with the express purpose of intensi-
fying assessment of technological applications and the avowed 
goal of disseminating their benefits. This created great pressures 
in the academic biomedical research community to validate their 
claims (if not their very existence) by pushing forward with the 
clinical application of new technologies. 
These differences in the development of a drug and a medi-
cal technology are at least partially responsible for the different 
criteria utilized in denominating a treatment as experimental. If 
one is trying to decide whether a medication is experimental, it 
is only necessary to establish that the drug has been approved 
for the particular usage in question by the FDA. A drug so-ap-
proved will have undergone a rigorous I application of the scien-
tific method and therefore will have been conclusively shown to 
be effective. On the other hand, a new technology is not sub-
jected to any regulatory process and thus there is no convenient 
line drawn between experimental and non-experimental technol-
ogies. Physicians and third-party payers, therefore, must assess 
the technology by other means. The approach may vary, but 
must, by lack of any alternative, consist of a scientific assess-
ment of the medical literature or solicitation of expert opinion. 
A working understanding of the scientific method is required to 
evaluate and lltilize medical opinion and testimony as well as 
the validity of the third-party payer's denial of coverage. 
The scientific method in its classic form12 is often not 
strictly adhered to in therapeutic trials because many physicians 
consider it morally unjustified to repeat a successful trial. The 
principles of the scientific method are adhered to by FDA man-
12. (1) Observation; (2) hypothesis; (3) experiment; (4) result; (5) conclusion; (6) 
repeat. 
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date in development of a new drug in the laboratory. A review of 
the laboratory development of a new drug will facilitate under-
standing of later applications of these principles to complex 
human situations. 
A prospective new medication is investigated because of a 
possible advantage it offers over an existing treatment. The 
pharmaceutical company may begin development of a drug for 
various reasons. Typically, elimination of a troublesome side ef-
fect of a known effective drug is sought through chemical modi-
fication of a parent compound. In other instances, a new discov-
ery elucidating a basic disease mechanism will trigger extensive 
basic research aimed at altering the newly discovered pathogenic 
mechanism. Equally as frequently, economic considerations will 
cause a pharmaceutical company to seek to modify a parent 
compound known to be effective so that it might market the 
drug under a different name and share in the profits, absent the 
expense of development. Uncommonly, a chance discovery will 
result in the recognition of a new drug with significant efficacy.13 
By whatever pathway development begins, the new drug 
will undergo extensive laboratory evaluations.14 The concept is 
to test the drug in a group of animals which are exactly like a 
control group of animals. The compound to be tested must be 
the only variable - the animals must otherwise be treated ex-
actly alike. The care with which this is done might surprise the 
non-scientist. The animals, for example, must be handled the 
same number of times in the same way, be in the same part of 
the laboratory so as to guarantee equal environments and be fed 
the same formula. In the laboratory the comparability of the two 
13. Rosenberg, Inhibition of Cell Division in E. Coli by Electrolysis Products from 
a Plantinum Electrode, 205 NATURE 698 (1965). 
14. Initial testing of the compound by the chemist for stability, purity and reliabil-
ity of production culls many drugs from production. Once a satisfactory drug can be 
produced in satisfactory form, it is subjected to testing in laboratory animals. A drug 
never progresaes beyond this stage in development if it does not produce the desired 
effect in the laboratory animal. Here is the first of many opportunities for the well-inten-
tioned and competent investigator to go astray. Whether the animal model is meant to 
be normal, malnourished, stresaed or diseased (so rendered by in-breeding, environmen-
tal manipulation or surgical removal of a vital organ) it remains a model. Many normal 
biologic systems are known to function differently in animals and humans. Many others 
are not known to function differently - but certainly do. Penultimately, many disease 
models, whether produced by line breeding of strains of diseased animals or by surgery, 
are manifestly imperfect models. 
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cohorts, or groups, is assured by a series of disarmingly simple 
techniques. The animals are randomly assigned by number to 
the control or treated group. This is done on an even-odd basis, 
a simple draw (treatment or no treatment) for each animal, or 
occasionally by computer. Thus, in the animal, the goal of uni-
formity of treated and untreated population is relatively easily 
achieved. This principle of randomization is a theme which we 
will have occasion to reexamine below. 
The uniformity of samples is further assured by the tech-
niques of "blinding." This process is meant to assure that no 
bias - either conscious or unconscious - enters the experi-
ment. The treatment is usually packaged in an identical form 
with an inactive compound so that laboratory personnel will not 
be aware of which animals are being treated. If both the subject 
and experimenter are unaware of which animal is a control and 
which is treated, the experiment is denominated "double blind." 
A moment's reflection will reveal the difficulty inherent in 
assuring the study is "blinded." What if the treatment causes a 
physiologic change in addition to the effect under study? For 
example, if the heart rate is slowed, it will be impossible to 
maintain the blinded nature of the study. What if the compound 
or its breakdown product has a characteristic odor? This latter 
problem has rendered suspect all dimethyl ~ulfoxide research16 
and evaluation of the antiemetic effect of marijuana. 
After strictly comparable control and treated groups are as-
sured by random selection and blinded cohorts,16 the data gener-
ated by the experiment must be evaluated. Many studies which 
are well-designed from the outset are made valueless or mis-
informing because of errors made at this point. 
In strict statistical theory, only the data necessary to prove 
or disprove the hypothesis should be evaluated.17 Good scientific 
procedure, however, dictates that large numbers of variables be 
recorded. Good scientific practice allows one to take any unex-
15. David, Pharmacology of Dimethyl Sulfoxide 6544, 12 ANN. REV. PHAR. 353, 371 
(1972). 
16. Such an investigation is termed a 'prospective, randomized double-blind study' 
and is generally agreed to be the format least subject to error. 
17. SWINSCOW, STATISTICS AT SQUARE ONE (1980). 
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pected results and design new experiments to see if the results 
are reproducible. Although this is relatively simple and usually 
done in the laboratory, the expense of human studies often leads 
to premature publication in which such "results" - unexpected 
observations made during the course of an experiment - are re-
ported as fact. For example, a study may fail to show an ex-
pected decrease in blood pressure, but the treated group's cho-
lesterol may fall. The investigator will then report the treatment 
effective in lowering cholesterol. A variation of this is the tech-
nique of dividing the treated and control groups into numerous 
subclasses after the results are tabulated in an attempt at isolat-
ing a subgroup for which the treatment is effective (or a sub-
group to delete so that the treatment will appear effective for 
the remainder).18 This technique is not statistically valid. The 
fallacy is explained by simple probability. In a rudimentary way, 
if one examines enough subgroups, the odds are that by pure 
chance a subgroup will eventually be found which shows (or ap-
pears to show) an advantage to the treated group. 
Should the investigator escape this temptation to select 
data, there are many other statistical pitfalls for the unwary. To 
begin with, as will be further explored below, the investigator 
must design the study with some statistical forethought. If the 
new medication the investigator is evaluating would be worth 
manufacturing if it were ten percent better than an existing 
drug, the number of animals in each group would have to be 
large enough to demonstrate such a relatively small difference 
with certainty. Many studies suffer from study groups which are 
too small to demonstrate the difference the investigators 
sought.19 This error (known as a Beta/Type II error) produces a 
result which shows no benefit when there may actually be one. A 
different and more pernicious error is the confusion of biologic 
and statistical significance.2o 
18. Salzman, Aspirin to Prevent Arterial Thrombosis, 307 N. ENGL. J. MEn. 113 
(1982). " 
19. Freiman, The Importance of Beta, The Type II Error and Sample Size in the 
Design and Interpretation of the Randomized Control Trial, 299 N. ENGL. J. MEn. 690 
(1978). 
20. For example, a diet might be shown to reduce the cholesterol from 285 to 280 
milligrams percent in the treated group. A fairly large sample size would show this to be 
a statistically significant difference. In fact, if a large enough sample size were selected it 
could be shown to be "very highly statistically significant" (probability = less than 
.0001; that is, less than 1/10,000 likelihood that the result was chance). On the other 
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A fourth statistical pitfall (in addition to data selection, in-
adequate sample size, and confusion of biologic and statistical 
significance) is the assumption of inadequate sample size. This is 
common in the laboratory evaluation of medications, but epi-
demic in the evaluation of new technologies. Here the investiga-
tor uses a statistical analysis which shows that the treatment is 
not statistically better than the control group. The statistical 
analysis is then juxtaposed to the raw data which, especially in 
small study sizes, may result in the impression that the treat-
ment is remarkably effective.21 The investigator then presumes 
that the result of treatment which "approached statistical signif-
icance" would have been statistically significant if the sample 
size had been larger. 
The requirements for good research are easily met when the 
drug is being studied in the laboratory. Human study, however, 
is more demanding. We will continue to trace the development 
of a hypothetical drug thi-ough human testing to demonstrate 
the process that a technology would need to undergo to be 
deemed efficacious. The next phase of the evaluation is usually a 
human study for toxicity. The major pitfall here is the chance 
that a rare, but very serious, side effect will be missed because of 
the relatively small sample size. The thalidomide story22 is a 
particularly disturbing example of this phenomenon. The FDA 
hand, the biologic significance of reducing the cholesterol five milligrams percent is cer-
tainly zero. In addition, it is likely that the treatment was associated with at least some 
undesirable side effects. Even more subtle, and therefore more pernicious, is the tech-
nique of reporting results as a percentage reduction in mortality. The distorting power of 
this technique is multiplied if the duration of the investigation is short. Sackett, Bias in 
Analytic Research, 32 J. CHRONIC DIs. 51 (1979), criticized in Pickering, Treatment of 
Mild Hypertension and the Reduction of Cardiovascular Mortality: the 'Of of By' Di-
lemma, 249 J.A.M.A. 399 (1983). 
The example given above is a fairly apparent one. The error is often compounded by 
a further assumption illustrated by the slight lowering of cholesterol values in the exam-
ple. It has never been conclusively shown that lowering cholesterol by any amount is 
beneficial. Thus an insignificant reduction based on an unproven assumption (that low-
ering of cholesterol will decrease the chance of an individual having a myocardial infar-
cation) is given legitimacy by an impressive degree of statistical significance. 
21. This is often described by authors as "almost statistically significant"! 
22. Smithells, Thalidomide and Malformations in Liverpool, Vol. i LANCET 1270 
(1962). 
The British drug thalidomide is a tragic example of a drug with a rare side effect not 
uncovered until after marketing. This drug was widely prescribed in the United King-
dom during pregnancy and not until after its release did it become apparent that it could 
cause severe birth defects. Some 250 children were affected before the connection was 
established. 
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currently recommends post-marketing surveillance23 of newly 
marketed drugs to mitigate this problem. 
The next phase of evaluation has the greatest opportunity 
for erroneous results. After toxicity studies established the safe 
dose of the drug in humans, it must be evaluated for efficacy. 
The evaluation for efficacy in humans requires the same care to 
ensure valid (a scientist might say reproducible - recognizing 
that the truth changes) results. 
When dealing with humans who suffer from a disease, inves-
tigators often fail to take the requisite first step to guarantee 
that the control group and treated groups are uniform - that is, 
strictly comparable. They may fail to include a control group. If 
a control group is used, it may not be selected in a randomized 
prospective double-blinded fashion, but rather an attempt is 
made to compare the treated group to another set of patients 
alleged to be controls. 
This comparison often involves the use of "historical con-
trois." The investigators select a group of patients previously de-
scribed and compare the results in the currently treated group 
with the results reported in the previous paper. The opportuni-
ties here for erroneous conclusions are legion. The previous 
group of patients may have been different in a variety of ways. 
The historical group may have been more or less sick or younger 
or older, for example. On the other hand, the supportive care 
may have improved with time, leading to improved outcome un-
related to the treatment being evaluated. Surprisingly, even the 
natural history of the disease may have changed.24 Although 
23. See Melmon, Drug Interactions and the Prepared Observer, 304 N. ENGL. J. 
MED. 723 (1981) for one example of such surveillance. 
24. Panem, Interferon and The Cure of Cancer, 249 ATL. MONTHLY (December 
1982), at 84. 
Much of the initial enthusiasm for Interferon can be traced to studies in the early 
1970's done at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm on patients with osteogenic sar-
coma. Eighty percent of the young adults with this bone cancer were known to develop 
metastatic lung lesions within one year and subsequently to progress to death, in spite of 
aggressive amputation undertaken as primary treatment. Interferon was studied as an 
adjuvant treatment with the hope that it would stimulate the patient's immune system 
to destroy the cancer cells which remained after the original amputation and thus pre-
vent clinically apparent lung metastasis. Only forty percent of the patients treated devel-
oped lung metastasis. Thus, Interferon was launched on its relatively disappointing pro-
motion against recommendations by a panel of National Cancer Institute scientists who 
9
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rarely recorded, the halls of academia ring with discussions de-
riding the ability of a particular group of physicians as an expla-
nation of differences in results. This is particularly true when 
surgical techniques are evaluated or when medical and surgical 
techniques are contrasted. U 
These rigorous standards are often met in the trial of a drug 
- especially if it is being tested in a setting where there is no 
other effective treatment (the patient is allergic to the drug or 
other known treatments have failed, for example). Such stan-
dards are rarely met in surgical or technologic applications, how-
ever. Some of the great physicians and medical tragedies of our 
time28 have been joined by the failure of adequate control. 
cautioned that only historical controls had been used. It was subsequently shown at the 
Mayo Clinic that the natural history of the disease had changed and "only" forty percent 
of the patients with osteogenic sarcoma treated by amputation alone develop lung metas-
tasis at one year. 
25. The validity of historical controls is a highly controversial subject of ongoing 
debate and a lengthy discussion is beyond the scope of this review. To be certain, the 
only clear choice is the prospective randomized double-blind study; to be fair, the pres-
sures are great to lower this standard. Not the least is the argument that it is unethical 
to have a control group of ill patients not receiving some treatment. If the situation 
permits, a previously known treatment felt to benefit only a small proportion of patients 
or to be only slightly beneficial to the majority of patients can be selected for the control 
group. This is probably better than no concurrent control, but is subject to serious 
problems. One nightmare is that each treatment, as it is compared successively to the 
previous ones, will show some benefit or at least be "as effective" without the benefit of 
the first treatment having been adequately proven. This can result in many comparisons 
and, years later, in an accepted treatment never having been demonstrated to be more 
effective than a placebo. Prout, Carcinoma of the Bladder, 5-Florouracil and the Criti-
cal Role of a Placebo, 22 CANCER 926 (1978). Proponents of strict controls are quick to 
point out that this problem could not arise if all treatments were evaluated in rigidly 
controlled studies from the outset. 
Another method of avoiding the ethical dilemma of the untreated (or placebo 
treated) control, with many pitfalls for the unwary, is the technique of selecting matched 
controls. This technique is frequently used in large epidemiologic studies seeking to asso-
ciate an undesirable side effect with a particular treatment. Cham biers, Statistical 
Methods in the Study of Toxic Shock Syndrome, 96 ANN. INTERN. MEn. 912 (1982), 
included in Todd, Toxic Shock Syndrome: A Perspective Through the Looking Glass, 
96 ANN. INTERN. MEn. 830 (1982). The group to be evaluated is often not selected by the 
treatment given, but rather by the outcome retrospectively. These patients are then 
asked about a particular exposure (environmental or therapeutic) and the frequency of 
the particular exposure compared to exposure in another matched group. The validity of 
this technique depends on how closely the comparison group is matched, how carefully 
the questions asked are administered, and the problem of a kind of selection bias (the 
natural tendency to "remember" an exposure felt to be causative either by the investiga-
tor or the subject). 
26. Henderson, Cancer of the Breast The Past Decade, 302 N. ENGL. J. MEn. 17,22 
(1980). 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/1
1984] ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 213 
Presuming a carefully designed study with appropriate con-
trols, bias exclusions and adequate numbers to detect relatively 
small benefits, the elements of analysis of data and conclusion 
remain in our examination of the application of the scientific 
method to medical treatments. The scientist in the laboratory 
relies on reproducibility and the "fit" with other scientific 
knowledge to insure the validity of the conclusion he draws from 
a particular investigation. The physician investigator, under-
standably driven to find a treatment to prevent more human 
suffering, is usually unwilling to subject his hypothesis that a 
given drug or technologic application is efficacious to repeated 
study to verify his results. He consequently often resorts to less 
trustworthy research methods. 
The most notorious is the publication of his results as a let-
ter to the editor or preliminary communication intended to spur 
other physicians to validate the result through formal investiga-
tion. More often than not, these preliminary findings are pressed 
into clinical practice without the sought-after confirmation. A 
more acceptable way to validate results without repeated studies 
is through statistical evaluation. 
A simple discussion of the student's T-test as applicable to 
medical studies is all that need concern us here.27 The student's 
T-test involves examination of the null hypothesis.28 In order for 
Radical mastectomy is a particularly tragic example of a surgical treatment which 
was widely applied without controlled study. Halstead, the great surgeon, began employ-
ing the radical mastectomy fifty years ago because of the widely held concept that the 
high recurrence rate of breast cancer was the result of local spread. Largely because of 
Halstead's skill and reputation, this multilating technique has been applied to genera-
tions of women without adequate study. Today most investigators are convinced that 
such extensive surgery is unjustified in most situations. 
27. As a background, however, it is worth briefly exploring the complexity of statis-
tical analysis. Medical schools are currently teaching basic statistics to their students. It 
is common for major medical journals to utilize statistical reviewers before accepting 
scientific articles for publication. It is equally common for major scientific studies to be 
specifically funded for statistical help in the design and analysis of the planned research. 
Nevertheless, many of the current controversies in medicine are being fought out in the 
statistical arena while frustrated clinicians and authors stand in the wings. (See supra, 
note 10.) 
28. In order to determine whether the results of a treatment and the control group 
are different, one tests the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the results 
of each group. The issue is what is meant by "no difference." Chance alone will result in 
some difference. When results are normally distributed, about five percent in a single 
population will by chance alone be outside the range of two standard deviations from the 
mean. Thus, if we by definition set the limits within which we regard the results as not 
11
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a result to be accepted, it should be "statistically significant," 
that is, have less than five chances in a hundred of being the 
result of chance (probability = less than 0.05). This means that 
a result accepted by the majority of physicians as effective still 
could be purely chance in 5/100 instances. 
The complexity of statistical arguments and knowledge of 
past medical treatments which have come and gone in spite of 
statistical "proof' of efficacy often leads physicians to two dia-
metrically opposed conclusions. The first conclusion is that the 
treatment had more responders than did the control. Therefore, 
even though there is no "statistical difference" between the two, 
the treatment is "better," "efficacious," or "approaches statisti-
cal significance." Paradoxically, the other extreme is equally 
common. The critical physician "knows" that "statistics can be 
used to show anything" and doesn't believe for a moment that 
results which have shown a treatment to be efficacious have any 
meaning in "clinical practice." A little reflection will demon-
strate how the same attitude can lead to the opposite conclu-
sions. In the first instance, the same physician who accepts an 
almost "statistically significant" result can reject a result that is 
statistically significant because it is "barely" so. He will be quick 
to point out that if one or two fewer patients had shown a bene-· 
fit from the treatment the results would not have been signifi-
cant. Conversely, the physician who rejects a statistically valid 
having any significant difference at twice the standard deviation, a value outside that 
range will be different ninety-five percent of the time and the same five percent of the 
time. This is written up 0.05" and denominated as statistically significant. 
The standard deviation is easily calculated by formula (the theoretical basis of 
which need not concern us here). One can then use the standard deviation of each sam-
ple (the treated group and the control group) to calculate the Standard Error of the 
Difference (S.E.D.). If one compares the observed difference of the means and deter-
mines how many multiples of the S.E.D. it is, all that remains is to look up this number 
in a probability table. For example, if the observed difference is 1.96 times the S.E.D., 
reference to a probability table will show that there is a 1:20 chance that the observed 
difference is due to chance. This is written up 0.05." The principles as laid out are simple 
enough but the variations are trying. Suffice it to say, there are innumerable variables 
which mandate statistical consultation in the design and evaluation of a study. 
The p values of tables are accurate in large sample sizes greater than 100, but if the 
study concerns small numbers of less than sixty there is much more chance of random 
variation and the T·test must be used. W. S. Gosset first published this test under the 
pseudonym "Student" (see infra, note 74) so that it is often known as the Student's T-
test. For practical matters one must only look up the value in a t table instead of a p 
table. A review of such a table would show that as the sample size becomes smaller a 
much larger difference is required for a difference to be significant. See supra, note 17 at 
1-42. 
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result because statistics can be misused may choose to accept a 
statistically invalid result for the same reason. 
This brief view through the looking glass is not intended to 
lead to an analogy with Alice in Wonderland, but rather to shed 
light on the medical community's decision-making process. As a 
result of the vagaries of human experiments, experimenters, and 
statistical analysis, most physicians have returned, perhaps un-
consciously, to the precepts of the scientific method. Before ac-
cepting a new treatment they would like to see results validated 
by further studies - ideally by competitive groups so that criti-
cal analysis can be assured.29 
Adherence to the scientific method is more difficult when 
complex technologies are applied to serious diseases. Patients 
and their families facing a potentially fatal disease are particu-
larly susceptible to societal beliefs in the power of technology, 
making a single case report adequate proof to a desperate pa-
tient and, sadly, often to their physician. Furthermore, the prob-
lem in blinding studies of technologic treatments can be insur-
mountable, although sham surgery and sham technologic appli-
cations have been utilized as controls. Bone marrow transplanta-
tion is the archetype of a technologic application to potentially 
fatal diseases and is, therefore, an ideal focus for detailed 
evaluation. 
III. BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION As A MODEL 
Bone marrow transplantation has recently come to public 
attention through the media because of its apparent curative po-
tential in certain diseases and the denial of coverage for the pro-
cedure by third-party payers. The introduction above to the sci-
entific method and its application to biomedical research serves 
as an appropriate framework through which to examine the ap-
plicability of bone marrow transplantation and the denial of pa-
tient access. The general categories of patients with illnesses 
theoretically amenable to treatment by bone marrow transplan-
tation include several major categories of disease. They comprise 
diseases of bone marrow failure (aplastic anemia), malignant dis-
eases of the bone marrow (principally leukemia), other sensitive 
malignancies treated with lethal doses of chemotherapy with the 
29. Relman, Lessons from the Darsee Affair, 308 N. ENGL. J. MEn. 1415 (1983). 
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intention of "rescue" by bone marrow transplantation, radiation 
accidents, congenital disorders of the red cell (such as thalas-
semia or sickle cell disease), certain rare immunodeficiency dis-
orders, and even rarer metabolic disorders. 
A brief description of the procedure of bone marrow trans-
plantation is necessary to place the medical-legal discussion in 
context. The threshold requirement is the availability of a com-
patible donor. Although bone marrow transplantation was first 
reported in 1957,30 marrow engraftment was only temporary. In 
that same year, French investigators failed in a dramatic at-
tempt to rescue six victims of a radiation accident.31 The occa-
sional patient in whom marrow engraftment did occur in the 
early human experiments died when the transplanted marrow 
mounted a lethal immunologic reaction against the host.32 This 
phenomenon, termed 'graft-versus-host disease' (or GVHD), 
spurred intense animal research which eventually led to the elu-
cidation of a histocompatibility locus antigen (HLA) on Chro-
mosome 6 in humans. This HLA locus contains at least thirty-
one separate antigen types resulting in 480 possible genetic com-
binations and thus is the most complex known genetic region in 
man.33 In addition, extensive study revealed that for a graft to 
be successful, an HLA-D match was required. This matching 
technique requires the mixing of donor and recipient lympho-
cytes to be mutually non-reactive. Both marrow graft rejection 
and G VHD can occur in patients who are fully matched, indicat-
ing that there are as yet unidentified genetic determinants of 
histo-compatibility. While these complexities were being investi-
gated, clinical grafting was successfully carried out between 
identical twins. The great majority of HLA-matched siblings are 
compatible by mixed lymphocyte testing while· the great major-
ity of non-HLA-matched siblings are not.34 This is presumably 
30. Thomas, Intravenous Infusion of Bone Marrow in Patients Receiving Radiation 
and Chemotherapy, 257 N. ENGL. J. MED. 491 (1957). 
31. Mathe, Transfusions et Greffes de Moelle Osseuse Homoloque Chez des 
Humains Irradies a Hautes Dose Accidentellemant, 4 REV FR. ETUDES CLIN. BIOL. 226 
(1959). 
32. Mathe, Immunogenetic and Immunological Problems of Allogeneic Haemo-
poietic Radio-Chimaeras in Man, 4 SCAND. J. HAEMATOL. 193 (1967). 
33. DAUSSET, Genetics of the HL-A System: Deduction of 480 Haplotypes, Hls-
TOCOMPATABILITY TESTING 53 (1970). 
34. Within a family, however, the situation is simplified since only four haplotypes 
can be involved (two from each parent). See Amos, Graft Donor Selection Based Upon 
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the result of closely linked determinations of histo-compatibility 
segregating with recognized HLA antigens. 
Consequently, although research is ongoing and transplants 
between matched and partially matched non-siblings have been 
successfully done, most research centers require that a candidate 
for transplantation have an HLA-matched donor. The donor is 
taken to the operating room and up to 150 bone marrow samples 
are collected, yielding about 750 milliliters of marrow, which are 
simply infused intravenously in the recipient. The donor is hos-
pitalized overnight and, except for local pain, has no ill effects. 
It is possible, of course, to have a life-threatening reaction to the 
general anesthetic. 
The recipient, on the other hand, will be critically ill for 
thirty days and may be in the hospital for three to four months. 
The expected hospital stay is thirty to forty days for identical 
twin grafts and forty to sixty days for HLA-identical sibling 
grafts. Unless the recipient is a twin or has an illness character-
ized by the absence of an immune response, he will receive large 
doses of chemotherapy (which will be fatal if engraftment fails) 
for four days prior to engraftment. The chemotherapy produces 
severe, albeit transient, nausea. If the patient is being engrafted 
for a malignant disorder, usually leukemia, he will also receive 
1000 rads of total body irradiation in an attempt at preventing 
recurrent leukemia.811 This alone would be fatal absent a success-
ful engraftment. Following this preparative therapy, the patient 
can expect to wait twenty to thirty days before the grafted mar-
row begins to function. During that period, the normal function 
of the marrow is absent and the patient requires transfusions of 
red cells, platelets to prevent hemorrhage, and antibiotics to 
treat infections which will develop. Unfortunately, some of the 
infections are due to viruses which respond poorly to current 
available therapy. Some forty to fifty percent of the patients will 
die either in the immediate post-engraftment period or later of 
infections or graft-versus-host disease. The procedure is rigorous 
enough that fifty is the absolute age limit for a patient and most 
centers only accept patients over forty if they have an identical 
Single Locus (Haplotype) Analysis Within Families, 6 TRANSPLANTATION 525 (1968). 
35. Thomas, Bone Marrow Transplantation, Part I, 292 N. ENGL. J. MED. 832, 838 
(1975). 
15
Wilkinson: Access to Medical Technology
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
218 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:203 
twin donor. If it is a malignant disease that is being treated, 
there will be many recurrences. Graft-versus-host disease occurs 
in approximately fifty percent of patients. Chemotherapy (ex-
cept in twins) is routinely administered after engraftment for 
approximately 100 days in an attempt to prevent or ameliorate 
graft-versus-host disease. In most studies, ten to twenty percent 
of recipients die of graft-versus-host disease36 and an equal 
number are left with chronic GVHD characterized by skin and 
liver disease. 
Research is continuing in many centers evaluating new 
methods of preventing GVHD. The fact that only twenty-five 
percent of otherwise acceptable recipients have an HLA-D 
matched sibling has also led many centers to actively investigate 
methods to select compatible unrelated donors. Nevertheless, 
these two facts - the limited number of prospective recipients 
with a match and G VHD - remain the major factors limiting 
the application of bone marrow transplantation. 
The indications for bone marrow transplantation can be 
conveniently divided into three groups. The first is that group of 
diseases for which transplantation is an established treatment. 
Little litigation would be expected to arise in those cases, how-
ever neither physicians nor third-party payers are in complete 
agreement as to which diseases properly belong in this group. 
The use of bone marrow transplantation has been advocated in 
many other diseases which are not established indications. 
These segregate into two main categories, those in which the ef-
ficacy (as compared to a more standard treatment) is under in-
vestigation and those for which there is lack of any alternative 
therapy. Litigation most often concerns these patients. A varia-
bly detailed analysis of the diseases in these categories follows 
which is intended to put the coverage decisions of third-party 
payers in context and supply a template for analysis of the legal 
rights of patients denied coverage. 
A. Established Indications 
Bone marrow transplantation was first successfully applied 
to aplastic anemia, a condition of bone marrow failure, in a logi-
cal attempt to replace a defective organ with a normal one. AI-
36. [d. Part II, at 897. 
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though this condition may arise from exposure to drugs and 
chemicals, the majority of cases have no identifiable cause.37 
Investigators followed the model scientific method quite 
closely. Initially, marrow transplants were carried out in patients 
who were in the end stages of disease and who had a twin donor 
so that there would be no problem with graft-versus-host dis-
ease. These transplants established the feasibility of bone mar-
row transplantation in aplastic anemia. 
A trial was initiated in 1974 to compare the standard treat-
ment38 with bone marrow transplantation.39 The technology it-
self prevented strict adherence to the principles of the random-
ized double-blind prospective controlled study. Ethically, control 
group patients could not be subjected to a sham transplant and 
they were aware that they were taking androgens instead. The 
investigators also would be able to tell which patient was on 
which treatment by the virilizing effect of the androgens and the 
severe side effects of the chemotherapy necessary for bone mar-
row transplantation. The control was, therefore, made up of pa-
tients who had no donor or who refused transplantation. 
The transplanted patients had a significantly better 
(probability = 0.0002)40 outcome as defined by survival. Fifty-
seven percent of the transplanted group were alive more than 
one year after the transplantation - although ten percent had 
severe graft-versus-host disease - leaving forty-seven percent 
alive and well. The control group had twenty-five percent alive 
with twenty-one percent free of disease. Not incidentally, 
randomization among control patients between androgens ther-
apy and no treatment (other than transfusion) failed to show 
any benefit for the treated group. Even this study, although ap-
37. Patients suffer from bleeding and infection due to failure of the marrow to pro-
duce platelets and white blood cells. Treatment is only supportive. Although patients 
often seem to respond to androgens, eighty percent of the patients receiving such ther-
apy will be dead within two years. Camitta, Severe Aplastic Anemia: A Prospective 
Study of the Effect of Early Marrow Transplantation on Acute Mortality, 48 BLOOD 63 
(1976). 
38. Androgens are the standard treatment. In this case the efficacy of the standard 
treatment had never been carefully investigated and was controversial. 
39. Camitta, supra, note 37. 
40. Thus by Student's T test there would be leas than 2: 10,000 probability that this 
result would occur by chance. 
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proaching the ideal, has been criticized for not having a true 
control group.41 The case for marrow transplant is firmly but-
tressed, however, by meeting the last requirement of the scien-
tific method - reproducibility. 
The International Bone Marrow Transplant Registry, com-
prising twenty-four worldwide teams, confirmed these results 
showing a forty-four percent one-year survival."2 This study si-
multaneously answers two questions which arise with the appli-
cation of any new technology. First, are the results a fluke or in 
some inapparent way biased? And second, can the results be du-
plicated by a group or groups without the experience of the orig-
inal proponent? Bone marrow transplant for aplastic anemia has 
survived a careful, albeit time-consuming, application of the sci-
entific method and is now the accepted treatment for patients 
under the age of forty with an HLA-compatible sibling. 
The second established indication for bone marrow trans-
plantation is acute leukemia. A complete explanation of the in-
dications for transplantation in acute leukemia depends on the 
success rate with other treatment in the various age groups and 
subtypes of leukemia and is therefore beyond the scope of this 
review. A tracing of the progress through acute myelogenous leu-
kemia in adults,"S however, is worthwhile to demonstrate again 
the pitfalls of deviations from the scientific method. For simplic-
ity, the series of investigations at one major pioneering bone 
marrow transplantation center in Seattle will be traced. 
The first ten patients were treated when their disease was 
refractory to all standard therapy - thus justifying the initial 
experiment. It was hoped that intensive pretreatment with 1000 
rads total body irradiation (TBI) would ablate the leukemia and 
the graft, in addition, would destroy any recurring leukemia 
cells. Six patients responded to the treatment, but leukemia re-
41. The patients who did not have a donor could in some unknown way have been 
different. In addition, the patients who refused transplantation could have been differ-
ent. Did they refuse because their physicians felt that they were not ideal candidates and 
either consciously or unconsciously transmitted their feelings to the patient? If this were 
the case, the control group might have represented the sicker patients. 
42. Bortin, Allogeneic Bone Marrow Transplantation for 144 Patients with Severe 
Aplastic Anemia, 245 J.A.M.A. 1132 (1981). 
43. Again, this must be limited to patients under age forty because of the markedly 
poor survival in older patients. 
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curred in five patients within seven months. One patient appar-
ently is cured after nine years." The Seattle group deduced that 
the preparation (1000 rads TBI) was not intensive enough to 
eradicate the leukemia and treated one hundred more patients 
with refractory leukemia.4 !! No randomized study comparing one 
treatment to the other was undertaken. This is ethically justifia-
ble on the basis of the poor results of the original pilot study 
and the presumption that more intensive treatment might eradi-
cate the leukemia. Early mortality was high, but thirteen per-
cent of the patients apparently were cured, being in remission 
four to eight years after treatment.46 
Based on these results, which were encouraging in this for-
merly one hundred percent fatal illness, a presumption was 
made. The hypothesis that patients who were in remission, and 
had so few leukemia cells that the cells could not be seen in the 
bone marrow, would do better was tested in nineteen patients 
with acute myelogenous leukemia who were in first remission af-
ter treatment with chemotherapy!' Twelve of those patients 
were alive without evidence of leukemia for two to four years 
after bone marrow transplantation. The majority of those pa-
tients presumably are cured. Based on this study, patients less 
than age forty with acute nonlymphocytic leukemia in first re-
mission are generally accepted as candidates for bone marrow 
transplantation. It is noteworthy that no randomized study was 
done. Various groups have been critical of this fact, suggesting 
that chemotherapy also was capable of producing apparent cures 
in this setting48 and recommending a randomized trial between 
chemotherapy and bone marrow transplantation.49 The Seattle 
group has initiated such a study.!!O 
44. Thomas, Allogeneic Marrow Grafting for Hematological Malignancy Using HL-
A Matched Donor-Recipient Sibling Pairs, 38 BLOOD 267 (1971). 
45. Thomas, One Hundred Patients with Acute Leukemia Treated by Chemother-
apy, Total Body Irradiation, and Allogeneic Marrow Transplantation, 49 BLOOD 511 
(1977). 
46. Dinsmore, Allogenic Bone Marrow Transplantation for Patients with Acute 
Lymphoblastic Leukemia, 62 BLOOD 381 (1983). 
47. Thomas, Marrow Transplantation for Acute Nonlumphoblastic Leukemia in 
First Remission, 301 N. ENGL. J. MED. 597 (1979). 
48. Peterson, Long-Term Disease-Free Survival in Acute Nonlymphocytic Leuke-
mia, 57 BLOOD 1144 (1981). 
49. Bortin, Bone Marrow Transplantation for Acute Leukemia: Factors Associated 
with Early Mortality, 249 J.A.M.A. 1166, 1174 (1983). 
50. Thomas, Marrow Transplantation for Acute Nonlymphoblastic Leukemia, 302 
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The bone marrow transplant team at University of Califor-
nia Los Angeles (UCLA) has reported a prospective study com-
paring bone marrow transplantation to chemotherapy in first re-
mission.1I1 This study is not strictly randomized. Those patients 
who did not have an HLA-identical sibling donor served as con-
trols and received intensification chemotherapy. The results, 
when subjected to actuarial statistical analysis, were somewhat 
surprising. IIi Bone marrow transplantation was superior to chem-
otherapy in preventing leukemic relapse, but the actuarial three-
year survival was not statistically different. Criticism has not ap-
peared in print, but will surely point out that the study size is 
small, the control not truly randomly selected and the three-year 
survival for bone marrow transplantation of forty-three percent 
is less than the sixty-five percent Seattle continues to report. lla 
The point is not that the results are confusing, only that 
strict adherence to the scientific method is required to be certain 
of results - regardless of alluring preliminary reports. Most he-
matologists still consider bone marrow transplantation the treat-
ment of, choice, largely because they have not experienced the 
relatively good long-term response seen in the chemotherapy 
arm of the UCLA study. II. 
The lastlill and most recent widely accepted indication for 
bone marrow transplantation is chronic myelogenous leukemia. 
This is an unusually stereotyped disease. Patients are usually in 
the third or fourth decade of life and have acquired an abnormal 
N. ENGL. J. MED. 409 (1980). 
51. Champlin, Treatment of Acute Myelogenous Leukemia - Bone Marrow Trans-
plantation Versus Consolidation Chemotherapy 19 AM. Soc. CLIN. ONC. PROC. 180 
(1983). . 
52. Kaplan, Non-parametric Estimation from Incomplete Observation, 53 J. AM. 
STAT. ASSN. (1958). 
53. Letter from E.D. Thomas, M.D. (Head of the Onocology Division of the Univer-
sity of Washington School of Medicine and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research 
Center in Seattle, Washington) to Kieran Fitzpatrick, M.D. (Member of the Northern 
California Permanente Medical Group Bone Marrow Transplant Advisory Board) dis-
cussing three-year survival. (March 4, 1980.) 
54. Children with acute leukemia generally have a better response to chemotherapy 
and it is only when they are at "high risk" for relapse that bone marrow transplantation 
is indicated. A lengthy discussion of those leukemic states considered to be high risk 
would not serve the purpose of this review. 
55. There are very rare non-malignant congenital conditions which because of their 
rarity are generally accepted indications for bone marrow transplantation although it is 
not possible to subject them to rigorous scientific scrutiny. 
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chromosome. The disease is easily controlled with oral chemo-
therapy which produces few side effects for thirty-six to forty-
two months. The disease then, more or less abruptly, changes to 
an accelerated phase which is fatal within two to nine months. 
There is no therapy other than bone marrow transplantation 
which delays the onset of this accelerated phase. The ability to 
demonstrate the disappearance of the abnormal chromosome 
provides convincing evidence that early apparent cures may be 
real. As a result of this lack of alternative therapy and the abil-
ity to demonstrate the elimination of the abnormal chromo-
some, lie many hematologists have accepted bone marrow trans-
plantation as the treatment of choice for chronic myelogenous 
leukemia, in spite of the preliminary nature of the data. No con-
trolled studies have been done. At Seattle sixteen cases have 
been done and ten patients are in remission.1I7 
B. Investigational Indications 
It is the patients with the diseases described below who are 
most frequently denied coverage and are likely to be litigants. 
As mentioned, bone marrow transplantation theoretically should 
be applicable to any malignancy which is highly sensitive to 
chemotherapy or radiation. In theory, doses of treatment could 
be utilized which would otherwise lead to fatal marrow changes 
and then the patient could be "salvaged" by bone marrow trans-
plantation. Malignancies which could be described as sensitive 
to treatment include oat cell carcinoma of the lung, Hodgkin's 
disease, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and neuroblastoma. All of 
these diseases have been treated with bone marrow transplanta-
tion in an uncontrolled fashion. liB For patients and their physi-
cians who have exhausted conventional therapy for these malig-
nancies, the use of bone marrow transplantation represents an 
attractive rational therapy. As will be discussed below, because 
56. E.g., Feder, Cure of Hematologic Meoplasia with Transplantation of Marrow 
from Identical Twins, 300 N. ENGL. J. MED. 333 (1979). 
57. Telephone interview with R. Storb, Ass't. Director of Bone Marrow Transplan-
tation in Seattle (April 20, 1982). 
58. Applebaum, Review of Use of Marrow Transplantation in the Treatment of 
Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma, 1 J. CLIN. ONCOL. 440 (1983); see also Seeger, Neuroblas-
toma: Clinical Perspectives, Monoclonal Antibodies, and Retinoic Acid, 97 ANN. INTERN. 
MED. 873 (1983); Graze, Induction of Complete Remission from Disseminated Oat Cell 
Carcinoma by Intense Chemoradiotherapy and Bone Marrow Transplantation, 19 
PROC. AM. Assoc. CAN. RES. 51 (1978). 
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of the few cases reported and the high rate of relapse (although 
successes have been reported), most physicians and all third-
party financiers would deem bone marrow transplantation in 
this setting as experimental. What is needed is the study of a 
large enough series of patients followed for long enough periods 
of time so that the risk/benefit ratio can be defined. 
A second group of patients in the investigational category 
likely to be litigants are those patients who are otherwise accept-
able candidates for bone marrow transplantation but lack an 
HLA-identical sibling donor. The literature contains quite a few 
reports of one or more patients who have had bone marrow 
transplantation from specially treated HLA-incompatible mar-
row donors,'~9 or with their own (autologous) marrow frozen and 
reinfused after otherwise lethal chemotherapy for cancer.60 Ap-
proximately one-third of the patients who are otherwise candi-
dates for bone marrow transplantation will have an HLA-identi-
cal sibling donor. For the other two-thirds, the use of other 
donors is an attractive alternative which has been accomplished. 
Again, these techniques have not been studied in sufficient num-
bers of patients for sufficiently long periods to be considered 
anything other than investigational. It is understandable that 
these patients, whose physicians may feel that further study cer-
tainly will confirm the validity of the new indication or tech-
nique, may have difficulty in understanding why the procedure 
is considered experimental in their particular case. 
Even more compelling is the patient who has no other ther-
apeutic option and in whom bone marrow transplantation might 
potentially be curative. This would include, for example, pa-
tients with the malignancies described above who have relapsed 
after the initial therapy, patients with sickle cell disease or 
thalassemia, or patients with A.I.D.S .. Patients with the relapsed 
malignancies have been transplanted with occasional success.61 
Patients with thalassemia were treated by a prominent hematol-
ogist without the approval of the University Human Experimen-
tation committee, resulting in severe sanctions.62 At least one 
59. Dinsmore, supra note 46. 
60. Gale, Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation in Patients with Cancer, 243 
J.A.M.A. 540 (1980). 
61. See supra, note 58. 
62. Jacobs, Pioneer Genetic Implants Revealed, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 8, 1980, at 
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A.I.D.S. patient has been transplanted unsuccessfully.63 
In each of these instances, the patients and their respective 
physicians made a conscious choice and selected an unknown 
treatment over supportive care. Although the choice is under-
standable, if we return to our analogy with the development of a 
new drug,6. these preliminary investigations would be analogous 
to Phase 1 human studies. The FDA does.not allow marketing of 
a drug at this stage but requires that efficacy be established. 
IV. THIRD PARTY FINANCING 
The difference in the source of funding (third-party payers 
versus pharmaceutical companies with vested interests) coupled 
with the high visibility of the patients with life-threatening dis-
eases being treated has focused attention on individual patients 
being denied access to bone marrow transplantation because of 
economic constraints. At the same time, health insurers have 
found themselves in a new role for which they are variously 
suited. Health insurance contracts, if they are not to be unen-
forceable for vagueness, must in some way delimit what the in-
surer has contracted to pay for. The terms usually delineate spe-
cific exclusions to a generally inclusive term. This inclusive 
phase is designed to exclude payment for treatments which, 
while perhaps beneficial, are not recognized generally by the 
medical community.6C1 In addition, one of the exclusion clauses 
denies payment for treatment which is "investigational," "exper-
imental" or "unproven. "66 
For treatments which involve medications, the classification 
is relatively easy. Since 1964 the FDA has required that a drug 
be proven efficacious as well as safe before it can be released for 
general distribution. Consequently, any released medication is 
no longer considered either unproven, unsafe nor inefficacious. 
With the technology explosion spurred on by the "technology 
I, col. 1. 
63. Hassett, Bone Marrow Transplantation in A.I.D.S., 309 N. ENGL. J. MEn. 665 
(1983). 
64. See supra, text accompanying notes 23-25. A phase 1 study is a toxicity study in 
humans. 
65. Chiropractic treatment is one example. 
66. See infra pages 228-31. 
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transfer" movement of the 1970's,67 patients were being exposed 
to new unproven technologies on the recommendation of physi-
cians. The majority of these exposures were in the diagnostic 
area, relatively harmless (from the standpoint of being noninva-
sive) and a relatively inexpensive part of the individual patient's 
treatment. In the aggregate, of course, the application of diag-
nostic technology is recognized as a major factor in the spiralling 
cost of medical care. 
As technology began to be applied to treatment, its cost and 
risks rose. At the same time, there was no agency comparable to 
the FDA charged with the control of the marketplace. Thus the 
convenient fine line represented by the release of a drug by the 
FDA did not exist referent to technology. 
The National Center for Health Care Technology (NCHCT) 
was created to evaluate the application of new technologies but 
does not have the authority to limit that the FDA does. In addi-
tion, although insurance carriers might be expected to welcome 
any guidelines set out by NCHCT even absent the force of law, 
the majority of the consensus development conferences (CDC) 
have concluded only that more evidence was needed. 
There has been no CDC on the'indications for bone marrow 
transplantation. In addition, the NCHCT was denied funding in 
1982 and is not functional. Nevertheless, major carriers have 
come to remarkably similar positions concerning the funding of 
bone marrow transplantation. Kaiser, for example, considers 
bone marrow transplantation to be the standard practice (if the 
recipient is less than age forty and has an HLA-matched sibling 
donor) for patients with: (1) severe aplastic anemia; (2) acute 
leukemia in remission - a) adults in first remission, b) child-
hood acute myelogenous leukemia (high risk) in first remission, 
c) childhood leukemia (low risk) in second remission; (3) chronic 
myelogenous leukemia in a controlled phase; (4) non-malignant 
conditions - a) severe combined immune deficiency, b) Wis-
kott-Aldrich syndrome. 
Blue Shield covers bone marrow transplantation for: (1) 
aplastic anemia; (2) acute leukemia in remission; (3) severe com-
67. See supra pages 205-06. 
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bined immunodeficiency; and (4) infantile osteopetrosis. The do-
nor must be an HLA-matched sibling. 
Medi-Cal, the Medicaid agency of the state of California, 
covers bone marrow transplantation for severe aplastic anemia 
and acute leukemia in remission. The donor must be an HLA-
match but need not be a sibling. They require that the trans-
plant be done within the state of California unless the centers 
within the state are at capacity. The recipient must be less than 
fifty years of age. 
California Children's Service, a public agency, covers bone 
marrow transplantation for: (1) severe combined immu-
nodeficiency; (2) acute leukemia in remission; (3) chronic mye-
logenous leukemia; (4) agnogenic myelofibrosis; (5) Wiskott-AI-
drich; (6) infantile osteopetrosis; (7) granulocyte dsyfunction 
disorders; and (8) Gaucher's Disease. 
More important than the covered situations themselves is 
an analysis of the basis for coverage decisions by third-party 
payers. For a technology like bone marrow transplant, without a 
mechanism for government approval or disapproval, these cover-
age decisions of third-party payers actually determine'the rate 
of utilization. 
The approaches vary from carrier to carrier, but most at-
tempt to assess the technology (here bone marrow transplant) 
through assessment of available medical literature or the solici-
tation of expert opinion. There are two polar approaches, 
breached by a continuum, followed by the majority of carriers. 
Some carriers focus primarily on well-designed clinical trials 
looking for evidence of safety and efficacy. A decision to cover 
only those situations where there was conclusiue68 scientific evi-
dence based on controlled trials would limit reimbursement of 
bone marrow transplant to aplastic anemia and adult acute leu-
kemia in first remission.69 
68. Student, 6 BIOMETRIKA I (1908). 
69. If the reviewers were rigid in their demands for scientific validation, they could 
point to the controlled U.C.L.A. study (see supra note 56) which showed no difference 
between marrow transplant and chemotherapy in first remission, and conclude that bone 
marrow transplantation was still experimental for acute leukemia in remission. 
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The other polar approach is to seek to determine what is 
acceptable medical practice. This usually means that the carrier 
seeks the opinion of specialists in the treatment of the disease to 
which the technology is being applied. The carriers often employ 
medical consultants who decide which experts to consult. They 
also often seek the opinion of medical specialty organizations.70 
This approach theoretically integrates a determination of safety 
and efficacy presuming that the medical community has made 
such determinations prior to incorporating the technology into 
their collective practices. This often is not the case in the in-
stance of a technology such as bone marrow transplantation. 
A. Position of Major Carriers 
Blue Shield's "Medical ~ecessity" pamphlet which is given, 
along with a health service agreement, to a consumer or group 
representative at the time of subscription, includes a general 
statement of covered services and a specific statement of condi-
tions for which bone marrow transplantation is a covered 
service. 
The "Medical Necessity" pamphlet contains a warning set 
out in the introductory paragraph in bold-face type that a physi-
cian order does not in itself make the service "medically neces-
sary." The definition contains two separate requirements: (1) the 
treatment must be established as safe and effective; (2) the 
treatment must be necessary and consistent with generally ac-
cepted professional medical standards and not experimental or 
"investigational." The receipt of requests for coverage from pa-
tients who have undergone bone marrow transplantation for a 
particular indication from a particular type of donor provides a 
list of emerging applications requiring scrutiny. 
New technologies (here new applications of bone marrow 
transplantation) as they mature are presented to the Medical 
Policy Committee where the decision is made designating the 
service as covered or non-covered. The decision as to which ap-
70. In the instance of bone marrow transplantation, the carrier might consult The 
American Society of Hematology or the American Society of Clinical Oncology. Given 
the controversy regarding the use of bone marrow transplantation in acute leukemia, the 
carrier seeking the recommendation of the American Society for Organ Transplantation 
might expect to receive a different opinion than that given by the aforementioned 
societies. 
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plications are ready to be taken before the committee is made by 
a physician charged with the responsibility of monitoring emerg-
ing technologies. 
The committee consults local experts and seeks recommen-
dations of committees of specialists. Before coming to a conclu-
sion regarding coverage, the Medical Policy Committee hears in-
vited expert testimony, both pro and con, in an open meeting. 
By this process Blue Shield recently extended coverage to infan-
tile osteopetrosis, an exceedingly rare disease that has been 
treated only two or three times by bone marrow transplantation. 
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Northern California 
Region) distributes to its prospective new members a booklet 
entitled "Disclosure Form and Evidence of Coverage" which de-
scribes covered benefits. The first paragraph in bold face type 
cautions the reader that it is only a summary and that "[t]he 
Health Plan Service Agreement must be consulted to determine 
the exact terms and conditions of coverage. A specimen copy of 
the service agreement will be furnished to you upon request." 
The general statement of coverage in bold face type reads: "The 
services described in this brochure are covered benefits only if 
and to the extent they are provided, prescribed or directed by a 
Plan physician. The Health Plan will not pay charges for ser-
vices from non-plan doctors and hospitals, except as otherwise 
indicated in this brochure." This appears in section three which 
contains thirteen subsections describing limitations. Subsection 
3-K provides for payment, following written assumption of 
financial responsibility, for treatment requiring "skills not avail-
able within" the Kaiser system. In the Southern California re-
gion the Kaiser Health Plan has a bone marrow transplant facil-
ity, but in the Northern California region this subsection 
effectively requires written prior authorization for coverage for 
bone marrow transplantation. The provisions of section three 
are often summarized as prescribed medical and hospital 
services. 
Section five, entitled "Exclusion, Limitations and Reduc-
tions of Benefits," contains three pertinent exclusions. The first 
excludes "experimental" procedures and procedures not gener-
27
Wilkinson: Access to Medical Technology
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
230 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:203 
ally available in Northern California.71 The second excludes 
blood. Arguably, bone marrow might be considered blood. Fi-
nally, all organ transplants except kidney transplants are ex-
cluded. The wording of the service agreement exclusion section 
is exactly the same, although not in bold type. 
The Permanente Medical Group (the physicians who con-
tractually supply medical care to members of the Northern Cali-
fornia Kaiser Health Plan) established a Bone Marrow Trans-
plant Advisory Board on May 10, 1979. It consists of four 
hematologists - two of whom are pediatric hematologists. The 
board uses literature review and solicits expert advisory opinions 
in order to decide what applications remain investigational and 
what are, or should be, the standard of practice. The emphasis 
shifts depending on the rarity of the illness and the availability 
of alternative forms of treatment. An extremely rare disorder 
cannot realistically be subjected to controlled blinded study. In 
considering such applications, the board gives greatest consider-
ation to invited expert opinion. On the other hand, for an appli-
cation which is relatively common, critical review of controlled 
studies is emphasized. At its inception the board only approved 
aplastic anemia with an HLA-matched sibling donor and adult 
acute leukemia in remission with an identical twin donor. These 
criteria are reviewed and revised semi-annually as a routine and 
more frequently if new scientific evidence indicates. 
Medicare coverage decisions are a product of federal agen-
cies and enabling acts. Section 1862(a) of the Medicare Law 
proscribes payment for services "not reasonable and necessary" 
for diagnosis and treatment.72 There is very little legal or admin-
istrative precedent interpreting this section of the law. 
Public Law 95-623, signed into law by President Carter No-
vember 8, 1978,73 established the National Center for Health 
Care Technology (NCHCT). As part of a duty to assess health 
care technology, the NCHCT was charged with the responsibil-
71. Bone marrow transplants were not available in Northern California until 1983 
but they were reimbursed, when approved, if done outside of Northern California. 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (1976). 
73. Perry, The National Center for Health Care Technology, 245 J.A.M.A. 2510 
(1981). Health Services Research, Health Statistics, and Health Care Technology Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-623, 92 Stat. 3443 (1978). 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/1
1984] ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 231 
ity of providing the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCF A) with the best available information concerning the 
technology under review for its use in making a Medicare cover-
age decision. 
Prior to the decision not to fund NCHCT, a Medicare reim-
bursement decision usually arose when a Medicare carrier re-
ceived a claim for an unfamiliar service. If the decision could not 
be made locally, it was referred to HCFA for a central decision. 
HCFA would in turn refer to the Public Health Service (PHS) 
any technologic or scientific issue for evaluation. The NCHCT 
(as an agency within PHS) would then place a notice in the Fed-
eral Register and begin an evaluation. Their evaluation included 
literature review and consultation with expert consultants. If 
necessary, a special panel was convened to arrive at a consensus. 
The NCHCT then would make a recommendation to HCF A. 
This procedure continues within PHS in a similar manner now 
that NCHCT is not funded. 
Medi-Cal, the Medicaid agency of California, makes its de-
cision independent of Medicaid directives. They do receive occa-
sional guidelines which are part of the input into the decision-
making process. When a patient's bill for treatment involving a 
new technology is submitted to the Medicaid office, they are ap-
proved locally unless the Medicaid advisor is not certain if the 
service is medically necessary or proven. Directives issue from 
the Benefit Section in Sacramento, delineating covered indica-
tions for bone marrow transplantation. The decision is based on 
solicited expert opinion and literature review. 
Decisions at the California Children's Services (CCS) can be 
made by medical personnel with or without a formal submission 
to an advisory panel. The medical director makes decisions 
based on a review of the pertinent literature and solicited opin-
ions from physician experts not employed by the CCS. The ex-
pert opinions and literature review are synthesized and if a new 
technology, or applications thereof, is a major variation, it may 
be referred to an advisory committee for final approval. 
The major third-party payers, then, uniformly deny cover-
age for bone marrow transplantation that is still experimental. 
This determination of investigational status is usually made by a 
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committee which bases its decision on the scientific analysis of 
experimental data or solicited expert opinion. These experts pre-
sumably base that opinion on a similar analysis of scientific 
data. 
B. Position of Marrow Transplant Centers 
The transplant centers themselves, of course, are a theoreti-
cal source of financing. As discussed above, the earliest stages of 
new drug investigation are funded by pharmaceutical houses. 
When the drug reaches the stage where it is being tested in con-
trolled clinical trials it is often supplied to investigators, and 
thereby patients, by the pharmaceutical houses. If the drug or 
treatment is not funded by industry, its cost is ordinarily part of 
the research grant which the investigator has obtained (most fre-
quently, from the National Institute of Health). Although some 
of the early transplant work was funded through grants, today 
bone marrow transplant centers require evidence of "adequate 
insurance coverage"'· or advance funding before they will con-
. sider a patient for bone marrow transplantation. 
V. COMPENSATING THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFF 
The attorney and his client who has been denied coverage 
for bone marrow transplantation have several options. Occasion-
ally, there may have been new developments since the last re-
view by the third-party payer and therefore a request for recon-
sideration of the decision is prudent. 
As of October 1983, certain states, such as Minnesota and 
Pennsylvania, have funded extraordinary procedures, including 
bone marrow transplantation. In California, California Chil-
dren's Service (CCS) funds indicated bone marrow transplanta-
tion for children who have no other coverage and whose parents 
are financially qualified. It is noteworthy that these state agen-
cies have necessarily set limits on what applications of bone 
marrow transplantation they will fund. 
The most reliable source of funding for patients who either 
have no insurance or who are not covered for the particular bone 
74. Letter from Robert McMillan of Scripps Clinic to L. S. Wilkinson (June 10, 
1983). 
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marrow transplant application has been a media appeal. Al-
though these campaigns sponsored by the local broadcast media 
generally have been successful, they have major shortcomings. 
To begin with, rural areas probably do not have the requisite 
population base to ensure a successful campaign. Time con-
straints may preclude the media approach altogether. Most im-
portantly, the access to medical technology should not depend 
on the public relations skills of the patients and their families. 
Parents, in particular, have found fund raising efforts emotion-
ally draining at a time when their children need them. A group 
of them have formed the Parents Action for Children's Cancer 
Treatment,711 with the intent of lobbying state and federal gov-
ernments to fund uninsured investigational procedures, particu-
larly bone marrow transplantation. Spokespersons for the group 
voice valid concerns that as media campaigns become more com-
monplace, public donations may decrease significantly.7s 
A. Declaratory Relief 
Should such a public relations campaign be untenable, the 
bone marrow transplant candidate who is denied access because 
of inability to pay has a problem in need of legal resolution. An 
unsuccessful resolution conceivably could deny life-saving treat-
ment. An insured party whose carrier denies coverage based on a 
determination that bone marrow transplantation would be ex-
perimental will, of course, bring suit against that carrier. The 
indigent has an equally high profile defendant in their particular 
Medicaid agency. The uninsured plaintiff who cannot qualify for 
Medicaid can only hope to look to the bone marrow transplant 
center. 
If consultation is timely, equitable jurisdiction may lie. For 
those with an insurance contract as well as those whose rights 
are delineated by statute, declaratory judgment can be sought 
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act." Forty-nine 
states also authorize declaratory judgments by statute. 
The irreparable harm consequent to denial of a necessary 
bone marrow transplantation is uniquely susceptible to prospec-
75. Hallissy, Contra Costa Times, Aug. 24, 1983, at 3, col. 1. 
76. [d. 
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976). 
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tive equitable relief. If the bone marrow transplant candidate 
was able to privately finance the bone marrow transplantation 
and seeks only compensation, a legal remedy may well be ade-
quate. However, if denial of insurance or Medicaid coverage re-
sults in denial of bone marrow transplantation and death, the 
plaintiff's remedy at law would be manifestly inadequate. The 
Court has construed liberally the language of 28 U.S.C. section 
2201, which requires an actual controversy involving legal rela-
tions capable of immediate and definite determination, refusing 
only to answer abstract questions or issue advisory opinions.~8 
The bone marrow transplant candidate seeking judicial con-
struction of a statute or an insurance contract would, therefore, 
not have to commence another action to meet the statutory re-
quirements for a declaratory judgment. The patient refused 
bone marrow transplantation coverage for an unproven indica-
tion would encounter several obstacles in their efforts to obtain 
a declaratory judgment. 
The most onerous to overcome is the caveat in Public Ser-
vice Comm'n v. Wycoff CO.79 where the Court stated that declar-
atory relief should be granted with caution if it would reach far 
beyond the particular case. Any judicial construction of a health 
insurance contract or a state or federal statute which granted 
coverage would be expected to foster litigation by other similarly 
situated plaintiffs. The defense certainly would contend that 
such a decision would lead to a flood of litigation and that it was 
just such a prospect that engendered the Court's caution in 
Wycoff·80 
In California, both statutorYSl and case lawi emphasize the 
court's discretionary power to refuse to exercise equitable juris-
diction. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has found declaratory 
judgment applicable to questions arising from the construction 
and operation of health insurance policies.88 Declaratory relief is 
78. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). 
79. Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). 
80. The Court did not di8cuss this caution except to note that the legal issues de-
cided by the declaratory judgment must be clear to enable a court to see the ramifica-
tions of its decision. 344 U.S. at 244. 
81. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1061 (West 1980). 
82. Hannula v. Hacienda Homes Inc., 34 Cal. 2d 442, 211 P.2d 302 (1949). 
83. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Stoner v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940). 
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particularly appealing when applied to denial of coverage for 
bone marrow transplantation because it serves to prevent the 
harm rather than compensate the victim. Unfortunately, the 
particular plaintiff's illness may progress at a rate which pre-
cludes even the relatively rapid relief of a declaratory judgment. 
This would seem to suggest that a judicial construction should 
be sought by a covered party who is well in order to establish 
their contractual rights (and, in the process, other similarly situ-
ated parties' rights) at a time when more deliberation would be 
possible. 
There are more serious limitations to this approach. The 
first is the universal statutory requirement for an actual contro-
versy, which has been construed generally to mean that declara-
tory relief is not available for future or contingent rights. Some 
courts have construed the actual controversy requirement more 
liberally, holding that where the future event is reasonably cer-
tain to occur and where all interested parties are represented, 
declarative relief may be granted even in the absence of a pre-
sent controversy.B. The Supreme Court, in construing a Tennes-
see statute,Ba has held that all interested persons must be made 
parties even in the setting of a present controversy. This second 
requirement is easily met when there is a present controversy 
(that is, the plaintiff has a transplantable illness). The number 
of persons seeking coverage for a bone marrow transplantation 
for a particular disease should be relatively small and discovera-
ble. In the instance of a future or contingent right, all covered 
persons would have to be represented by a class action. The re-
quirement for reasonable certainty could be met for the rela-
tively common disorders. That is, given insurance or Medicaid 
coverage of a certain number, the evidentiary burden of showing 
that a disease of a given prevalence is reasonably likely to occur 
would be a matter of relatively simple statistics. With a rare dis-
order, however, it would take an enormous covered population to 
make it statistically "reasonably likely" that the future event 
would occur. 
The requirements that: (1) the plaintiff seek counsel prior 
to the harm, (2) there be a present or a reasonably likely future 
84. Caldwell v. Rosenberg, 47 Cal. App. 2d 143, 117 P.2d 366 (1941). 
85. Nashville C. and St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1932). 
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controversy, (3) that all interested persons be represented, and 
(4) that the court exercise its discretionary power with caution if 
its decision would have far-reaching effects, limit the remedy of 
declaratory relief to a small fraction of patients denied (or po-
tentially denied) bone marrow transplantation access. Declara-
tory relief would not be applicable to patients who were neither 
insured nor indigent. 
B. Due Process 
It is clear that should the plaintiff fail to obtain declaratory 
relief, irrespective of the theory under which relief is sought, the 
case will turn on an examination of the process by which the 
carrier or agency denies coverage. The extensive state regulation 
of hospitals receiving Medicaid funds, brought about by efforts 
at cost-containment, raises the possibility that hospital decisions 
can be challenged successfully as violative of the procedural due 
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 
The Supreme Court was asked to uphold such a successful 
due process challenge in Blum v. Yaretsky.88 The action was 
brought by nursing home residents representing a class of Medi-
caid patients alleging that they were transferred without notice 
or opportunity for a hearing. The facts were not disputed and 
only the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amend-
ment was litigated. In spite of finding extensive state involve-
ment,87 the Court found insufficient nexus between the state and 
the transfer decision, quoting with favor limiting language from 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. and its predecessors.88 The 
suspicion that . unwritten policy considerations influenced the 
Court's failure to find "state action" is supported by a strong 
86. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 u.S. 991 (1982). 
87. Ninety percent of the medical care of the residents was paid for by the state. 
The level of care stratification which the nursing home applied was promulgated by the 
state. 
88. "That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however dis-
criminating or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 13 (1947). "The mere fact that 
a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of 
the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). "The complaining party must also show that 'there is a 
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated 
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' " 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, (1982), citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/1
1984] ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 237 
dissent from Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall. Nev-
ertheless, it is doubtful that any amount of creative lawyering 
could· make a stronger case for state involvement in a private 
health care facilities decision than that made by the facts of 
Blum v. Yaretsky. A decision by a Veteran's Administration 
Hospital or a military facility to forego bone marrow transplan-
tation might be better attacked if it could be shown that the 
decision was an administrative one rather than an individual 
medical judgment. The evidentiary burden would constitute a 
significant hurdle in any such litigation. 
The Medicare/Medicaid decision-making process is the 
most susceptible to a successful due process challenge. The deci-
sion for coverage is made variously at local or national levels. 
Medicare decisions are not applicable to bone marrow transplan-
tation because of age limitations. In California, Medi-Cal has 
made a decision to fund only acute lymphoblastic leukemia and 
aplastic anemia, although individual exceptions have been made. 
The decision-making process mayor may not be adequate, but 
the patient has neither hearing nor notice. The decisions made 
by state officials, administering Medicaid funds under Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1396, are clearly 
exercises of state power which must conform to the restraints of 
the fourteenth amendment. 
Blum v. Yaretsky89 appears to limit due process challenge to 
that class of patients denied bone marrow transplantation by di-
rect state actions. For that plaintiff, however, injunctive relief 
based on violation of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth 
amendment should be available. This remedy might be made 
impracticable by the time required for an evidentiary hearing 
and administrative resolution of the claim. Presuming, however, 
that bone marrow transplant centers would be willing to proceed 
under those uncertainties, injunctive relief could provide prompt 
legal resolution for the individual plaintiff. Significant societal 
gains could be expected to follow, both initially, from the admin-
istrative decision made establishing coverage for, the illness suf-
fered by the particular plaintiff, and subsequently, from proce-
dural reform. 
89. Blum v. Yaretsky. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
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C. Anti-Trust Action 
Recent cases brought before the Supreme Court seeking ap-
plication of the Sherman Antitrust Act90 to health-insurance 
carriers91 suggest an alternative cause of action. Prior to 1975 
the health care industry was not exposed to antitrust liability 
under the Sherman Act because it was thought not to meet the 
requirement for interstate commerce. 
The Supreme Court, in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of 
the Rex Hospital, however, found that typical hospital activities 
brought most hospitals within interstate commerce.92 The 
learned professions formerly were held exempt from the Sher-
man Act, but in recent years have been brought under the Act's 
requirements.93 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act94 exempts the "business of in-
surance" from the Sherman Act to the extent it is regulated by 
state law. In Group Life and Health Insurance Co. u. Royal 
Drug Co., however, the Supreme Court narrowed the definition 
of "business of insurance"91i thereby removing McCarran-Fergu-
son protection from many of the practices of insurance carriers. 
The Court held that only risk-spreading activities were the busi-
ness of insurance, and specifically found that "risk-reducing" ac-
tivities were not the business of insurance.96 
Therefore, both hospitals and health-insurance carriers have 
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). 
91. Group Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), 
rehrg. denied 441 U.S. 917; Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of 
Virginia, 469 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). 
92. 425 U.S. 738, 744 (1976). 
93. Group Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205; Virginia 
Academy of Clinical Psych. v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476; Ballard v. Blue 
Shield of Southern West Virginia, Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 430 
U.S. 922. 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1976). 
95. Royal Drug involved an antitrust challenge to a Blue CrosslBlue Shield provider 
arrangement whereby policyholders were given preferred status at participating pharma-
cies. Nonparticipating pharmacies challenged the provided agreement alleging it was a 
price fixing conspiracy. The insurance carrier tried to assert the McCarran-Ferguson de· 
fense. The Court found, however, that provider arrangements were risk-reducing, not 
risk-spreading, and that only the latter constituted the "business of insurance" exempt 
from antitrust liability under the McCarran-Ferguson exception. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). 
96. [d. at 214-215, n.12. 
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antitrust liability for certain activities which fall within the 
Sherman Act. Exclusion clauses and decision-making processes 
about covered technologies are arguably such activities. The 
health-insurance carrier could be expected to assert that the ex-
clusions (for experimental or investigational services) were nec-
essary to enter into an insurance contract (risk-spreading agree-
ment) and thereby should be considered risk-spreading activity. 
The Court, however, in Royal Drug specifically rejected that ar-
gument.97 Furthermore, the Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that activities which resulted in a reduced premium should 
be considered risk-spreading, specifically distinguishing risk-
spreading from risk-reducing.98 
Merely finding that hospitals and non-risk spreading activi-
ties of insurance carriers are not exempt from the Sherman Act 
does not, of course, establish liability. Section One of the Sher-
man Act prohibits combinations, contracts, or conspiracies in re-
straint of trade.99 The plaintiff must prove two elements to es-
tablish a Section One violation: (1) a "concerted action," and (2) 
a resultant restraint of trade. loo Courts apply either the per se 
rulelol or the rule of reasonl02 in deciding whether an activity is 
a concerted action that restrains trade and, therefore, violative 
of the Sherman Act. 
If a plaintiff could make the showing of a concerted action, 
a court would likely apply the per se rule, which is conclusory, 
and would allow the plaintiff to prevail. The health-insurance 
carriers are highly competitive and it seems unlikely that a 
plaintiff could make such a showing. It could be argued, how-
ever, that the similarities in coverage for bone marrow trans-
plantation amongst the various third-party payers is indicative 
of an agreement. The same competitiveness that makes agree-
ment unlikely would also mandate the presumption of harmful, 
illegitimate conduct that underlies the per se rule. Absent evi-
97. "[I]t does not follow that because an agreement is necessary to provide insur-
ance, it is also the 'business of insurance.''' ld. at 213-214, n.9. 
98. ld. at 214-215. 
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
100. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST SECTION 109 (1977). 
101. Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sup., 441 U.S. 1, 7, 8 (1979) 
rehg. denied 450 U.S. 1050. 
102. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-
692 (1978). 
37
Wilkinson: Access to Medical Technology
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
240 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:203 
dentiary support of an agreement, it seems unlikely that a court 
would hold the similarities in coverage to be conclusive of con-
certed action. 
The application of.antitrust law to the bone marrow trans-
plantation services which, it will be remembered, also deny ac-
cess to medical technology if the bone marrow transplant candi-
date has no proof of adequate finding, is more feasible. The 
physicians and other health care personnel who comprise such a 
bone marrow transplantation service or team are frequently on 
salary and therefore relatively unconcerned about the source or 
extent of a bone marrow transplant candidate's funding. lOS The 
same cannot be said of hospital administrators who are univer-
sally caught between increasing efforts at cost containment by 
third-party payers and the spiralling cost of medical care. Al-
though to an extent competitive, the hospitals have a uniform 
concern that unfunded care be kept to a minimum. The cost to 
the patient of a bone marrow transplant may exceed $100,000. 
Additionally, a highly-publicized charitable bone marrow trans-
plantation could open the "floodgates of supplication." 
If the plaintiff could make a showing of concerted action, 
the conduct probably would withstand any balancing required 
by the rule of reason and be held to be in restraint of trade. The 
extent to which the facts of the particular case pointed toward 
agreement among the hospitals would most likely be determina-
tive as the policy considerations required by the rule of reason 
are equivalent in merit. Although it is obviously repugnant to 
the concept of justice that hospitals should conspire to deny ac-
cess to a life-saving treatment, it is also quite untenable that the 
stability of hospitals be threatened by the financial burden of 
mandated charitable bone marrow transplants. 
In summary, in spite of recent developments in antitrust 
law, it seems unlikely that third-party payers would be found by 
a court to be in illegal concert to restrain trade by restricting 
access to bone marrow transplantation or other medical tech-
nologies. On the other hand, hospitals have the economic incen-
tive to deny such coverage and their denial of access to bone 
103. Institutional economy is becoming a major issue even in affluent university hos-
pitals and the physicians, at least, are undoubtably concerned to the extent that un-
funded bond marrow transplants may jeopardize institutional viability. 
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marrow transplantation on the basis of inadequate funding is 
uniform. Given sufficiently probative evidence of agreement, a 
court might well sustain an antitrust action brought by an un-
funded bone marrow transplant candidate denied access by a 
hospital. 104 
D. Interpretation of a Contract .of Adhesion 
, The courts in California have long looked with·a jaundiced 
~ye at contracts of adhesion. This hostility has its foundation in 
concepts of consumer protection and unequal bargaining 
strength of contracting parties. In Schmidt v. Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., the court defined the adhesion contract as: 
"[A] standardized contract which, imposed and drafted by the 
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscrib-
ing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject 
it."loa Although such contracts of adhesion are enforced accord-
ing to their terms in the absence of ambiguity,t06 courts have 
been quick to find ambiguity. Insurance contracts are the arche-
type adhesion contract. The subscriber is verbally told the terms 
of the coverage, often with more than a little puffery, and subse-
quently signs a form contract characterized by oblique or ob-
scure language. 
The court in Maxon v. Security Ins. Co. recited three rules 
of construction for insurance contracts: 
[A]ny ambiguity or uncertainty in the contract is 
to be resolved against the insurer; if semantically 
permissible, the contract will be given such con-
struction as will fairly achieve its object of secur-
ing indemnity to the insured for losses to which 
the insurance relates; and if the insurer uses lan-
guage which is uncertain any reasonable doubt 
will be resolved against it . . . .107 
104. Hospitals which have used Hill·Burton funds to build or expand their physical 
plants have a mandate to provide community service to an extent equal to six percent of 
their incomes. An imaginative court could design a remedy directing the preferential use 
of those funds for bone marrow transplantation. 
105. 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 737, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367, 369 (1968). 
106. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783 
(1961). 
107. 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586, 590 (1963). 
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The California Supreme Court has further refined the stan-
dards of construction for contracts of adhesion. In Atlantic Nat. 
Ins. Co. v. Armstrong,108 the court found that the form of an 
insurance contract must be interpreted in light of the reasonable 
and normal expectations of the parties with regard to the extent 
of coverage. And, in Steven v. Fidelity Gas CO./09 the California 
Supreme Court found that if an insurer "deals with the public 
upon a mass basis, the notice of non-coverage of the policy, in a 
situation in which the public may reasonably expect coverage, 
must be conspicuous, plain and clear."llo 
Although these rules of construction set a high standard for 
the insurer, other California courts have required even more. In 
Arata v. Cal. Western States Life Ins.,m the court set a very 
high standard indeed. The action pivoted on judicial construc-
tion of the contract. In Arata, the widow of the insured, a hemo-
philiac attorney, brought suit to recover under an accident in-
surance policy which had an exclusionary clause denying benefit 
if death was contributed to by disease. He slipped and fell, strik-
ing his head, and subsequently died a few days later of in-
tracranial hemorrhage. The court found that the deceased had 
congenital factor VIII deficiency (hemophilia) and would not 
have died but for the bleeding disorder. The court, nevertheless, 
found that the factor VIII deficiency did not contribute to death 
within the intent of the exclusionary clause since the accident 
was the "prime or moving" cause of death. This verdict is diffi-
cult to reconcile with even the most rigorous application of ad-
hesion contracts' principles. The decedent was a lawyer with a 
congenital bleeding disorder of which he was aware. The exclu-
sionary clause was unambiguous. The reasonable expectation of 
both parties must have been that, should the insured die of an 
injury which would not have been fatal but for the underlying 
bleeding disorder, there would be no recovery. The result ap-
pears to amount to strict liability for insurance carriers. "It has 
nothing to do with insurance. It has nothing to do with subjec-
tive fault. It has to do with compensation for a loss resulting 
from a deliberately assigned risk - assigned, that is, to the 
108. 65 Cal. 2d 100, 112, 416 P.2d 801, 809, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569, 577 (1966). 
109. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962). 
110. [d. at 878, 377 P.2d at 294, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182. 
111. 50 Cal. App. 3d 821, 123 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1975). 
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other fellow. "112 
A subsequent California Supreme Court case provides an in-
teresting contrast. In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospi-
tals,1l8 the court enforced an arbitration provision in a medical 
services contract between the plaintiff's employer and Kaiser. 
The court explained that the policy behind adhesion contract 
construction was prevention of the imposition of contract provi-
sions by a stronger party on a weaker. The court found the Kai-
ser contract in question was negotiated for the plaintiff by repre-
sentatives of his union who had parity of bargaining strength 
with Kaiser. There were no oppressive features of the contract 
and the provisions benefited Kaiser and the members equally. It 
is interesting to speculate whether this holding results from 
strong policy considerations in favor of arbitration or is an at-
tempt to limit the virtual strict liability imposed by Arata. Al-
though third-party payers have contracts with groups, they also 
have many individual subscribers. It seems nonsensical to apply 
different rules of construction to precisely the same contract 
provisions depending on whether the plaintiff is part of a group 
or an individual member.ll4 
The health-insurance carriers' disclosure forms, as discussed 
above, contain conspicuous statements of the exclusions. The 
language is clear and not misleading. A case brought for breach 
of contract by a plaintiff denied coverage for bone marrow trans-
plantation would turn on the meaning of the words "investiga-
tional" and "experimental." These words appear in virtually all 
health insurance contracts. I III Ironically, as we have seen above, 
112. Cowen, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1092 
(1965). 
113. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976). 
114. A recent California appellate court case, while setting out no new principles for 
adhesion contract interpretation, illustrates the extent to which courts will enforce the 
reasonable expectations of the insured. In Ponder v. Blue Cross of So. Calif., the plaintiff 
was denied coverage by Blue Cross for treatment of temporomandibular joint syndrome. 
The contract specifically excluded coverage for dental care and within that exclusion 
denied coverage for temporomandibular joint syndrome. The court found that the term 
was not comprehensible to lay persons and therefore did not meet the "plain and clear" 
requirement of Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Company. (Steven, 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 
P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172; Ponder v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 145 Cal. App. 
3d 709 (1983).) 
115. Bunker, Evaluation of Medical-Technology Strategies, 306 N. ENGL. J. MHD. 
624 (1982). 
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the decision-making processes of the insurance carriers al~o turn 
on' the same words. 
If the Technology-Assessment Committee of Blue· Shield or 
the Bone Marrow Transplant Advisory Committee of Kaiser 
were to apply the same strict scientific standards to bone mar-
row transplantation that the FDA applies to the evaluation of a 
new drug for safety and efficacy, there would be very few cov-
ered indications for bone marrow transplantation. The FDA con-
siders (and enforces its decision by withholding the drug from 
the market) a drug investigational until it has been proven safe 
and efficacious through rigorous application of the scientific 
method. This showing of efficacy requires that the drug be inves-
tigated in controlled clinical trials by multiple groups, and that 
these trials, when subjected to a statistical analysis, prove the 
drug to be efficacious. The determination of safety is a weighted 
analysis of risk and benefit, taking into consideration the availa-
bility of alternative treatments. The drug does not have to be 
more efficacious than existing drugs on the market. 
In contrast, only twenty percent of procedures of medical 
technologies have been adequately tested by randomized clinical 
trials. lIe Bone marrow transplantation has been proven effica-
cious in only one controlled clinical trial which evaluated the 
procedure in patients with aplastic anemia. That study was con-
trolled but not randomized. ll7 Patients without matched donors 
served as the controls. Additionally, of course, it is not feasible 
to "double blind" a procedure such as bone marrow transplanta-
tion. Observer bias was excluded by comparing only patient sur-
vival, death being an endpoint subject to little observer varia-
tion. If health-insurance carriers were to require scientific 
validation of efficacy, then bone marrow transplantation would 
be considered not investigational or experimental only as treat-
ment. for aplastic anemia. 
Most third-party payers also cover bone marrow transplant 
for acute leukemia in remission. This decision is based on large 
studies which used as a control survival rates from the literature 
or their own institution. Bone marrow transplantation for leuke-
116. Lashof, Government Approaches to the Management of Medical Technology, 
57 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MEo. 36, 39 (1981). 
117. Camitta, supra, note 37. 
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mia in remission thus became an "acceptable medical practice" 
or even "standard medical practice" without adequately con-
trolled studies. Major third-party payers have, at least tacitly, 
accepted these terms as antonyms for "investigational" and 
cover bone marrow transplantation for acute leukemia in remis-
sion. It is for less common or rare diseases where evidence from 
well-designed clinical trials is unavailable (or because the rela-
tive scarcity of bone marrow transplant candidates with an ac-
ceptable donor will take many years to accumulate) that cover-
age is more likely to be denied. In many instances, bone marrow 
transplant centers are transplanting patients with these diseases 
regularly, yet there are no published reports of the results (or at 
best, a few case reports). In most cases, experts would agree that 
attempted treatment with bone marrow transplantation is rea-
sonable. On the other hand, most, if not all, disinterested ex-
perts would agree that the efficacy of the application is un-
proven. This dichotomy is the nexus of the dilemma. Third-
party payers who insist on at least published evidence of effi-
cacyll8 will lag behind enthusiasts in their coverage of the appli-
cation of bone marrow transplantation. 
The patient who becomes a bone marrow transplant candi-
date, when a new application for bone marrow transplantation is 
under investigation, is the most likely to· have coverage denied 
and, at the same time, to be an insured who has a 'reasonable 
and normal expectation' of coverage. HB If the court took the po-
sition of the Arata court,120 almost any construction of the term 
'experimental' would probably lead to plaintiff recovery. The 
only defense the carrier would have to recovery would seem to 
be the introduction of a "patient consent to investigational ther-
apy" form if the bone marrow transplant center required the pa-
tient to sign such a release. This would, of course, serve to evi-
dence notice and concurrence on the part of the plaintiff, as well 
as impeach the expert witness. The court in Ponder, however, 
found that the time for interpretation of an adhesion contract is 
at acceptance, "not when the incident triggering coverage first 
118. Many experts, cognizant of the proliferation of medical technology without col-
lected study, would require that an expensive and high risk (40% mortality) procedure 
like bone marrow transplantation be shown to be more efficacious than existing treat-
ment before deeming it the standard of practice for a given indication. 
119. Armstrong, 65 Cal. 2d at 112, 416 P.2d at 809, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 577. 
120. 50 Cal. App. 3d 821, 123 Cal. Rptr. 631. 
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arises."l2l In spite of the arcane neologisms in the court's conclu-
sion,122 the reasoning in the body of the opinion is sound123 and 
other courts are likely to take a similar view of defenses arising 
concurrently with the need for coverage. A defense based on a 
plaintiff's knowledge or understanding at the time of treatment, 
therefore, is likely to be futile. 
On the other hand, if the court were to find that the insur-
ance contract was not a contract of adhesion, then coverage 
might well depend on which measure of "non-investigational" 
the court adopted. If the court accepted a likely defense asser-
tion that a technology must be scientifically proven to be safe 
and effective to be deemed non-investigational, a plaintiff seek-
ing coverage or recovery for bone marrow transplantation done 
for a rare indication would probably be denied coverage. If, on 
the other hand, the probable assertion of the plaintiff that a 
"medically acceptable" measure of "non-investigational" be ap-
plied, both the plaintiff and defense could assemble an impres-
sive panel of expert witnesses. 
The plaintiff's case might turn on whether he or she was a 
group or individual subscriber to the health-insurance contract. 
Although the Madden l 2.f. court emphasized this difference, the 
announced policy basis underlying the decision was the parity of 
bargaining strength between the parties. It could be successfully 
argued that although the extent of coverage, in regard to special 
inclusions, may vary between individual and group subscribers, 
the general extent of coverage and the exclusionary clause for 
experimental procedures are identical. The defense could cer-
tainly assert that this identity of terms makes the individual 
subscriber the beneficiary of the bargaining strength of the 
group subscriber. It seems likely that both the Madden and 
Arata decisions arose primarily from policy considerations. 
The outcome of a breach of contract action based on inter-
pretation of the term "experimental" in an adhesion contract 
would also be likely to turn on policy considerations. The court, 
121. 145 Cal. App. 3d at 727. 
122. "We diagnose the exclusion of this contract to suffer from 'complexified occul-
tation clause syndrome' [and] [t]hat malady alone is fatal ..... " [d. at 728. 
123. [d. at 726, 727. 
124. Madden, 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976). 
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concerned with consumer protection, would have to balance ben-
efit to the individual of construction of the contract against the 
insurer, with the risk to society (both economically and medi-
cally) of the proliferation of unproven medical technology. 
If the bone marrow transplantation was undertaken on the 
basis of a logical extension of current applications in a patient 
who had exhausted known therapy, the plaintiff's case is much 
more difficult. If the court considered the contract one of adhe-
sion and took the Arata approach, the plaintiff might recover. 
That is, although the bone marrow transplantation was proven 
neither efficacious nor "standard medical practice," the court 
could find that the bone marrow transplant was not investiga-
tional within the intent of the exclusionary clause. The court in 
Arata did precisely that by finding that the death of the plain-
tiff's deceased would not have occurred but for his hemophilia 
while holding that his death was not contributed to by a disease 
within the meaning of the exclusionary clause. The plaintiff's 
deceased in Arata was an attorney and, therefore, bargaining 
parity could be presumed. The policy considerations that but-
tress the opinion are not easy to extract. Nevertheless, a similar 
"construction" of the terms of a bone marrow transplant plain-
tiff's contract might result in recovery. 
Under any other construction, whether or not the court 
found the contract to be one of adhesion, it is difficult to see 
how a plaintiff might argue that his transplant was not investi-
gational. If bone marrow transplantation had been successfully 
undertaken once before in a similar situation, the plaintiff could 
argue that one success was sufficient to show that bone marrow 
transplantation could work. Therefore, the procedure was not an 
experiment, and the only real question was how often it would 
work. 
In summary, the plaintiff with health insurance or Medicaid 
may well be able to get relief under an adhesion contract theory. 
If the bone marrow transplant was done for an uncommon con-
dition with small numbers of patients available for study, and 
had been successfully done at more than one center, the court 
would likely conclude that the procedure was not experimental 
within the expectations of the insured. If the indication was one 
covered by some third-party payers and not others, the plaintiff 
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should prevail with little difficulty. At the other end of the spec-
trum, if the bone marrow transplantation were the first or sec-
ond one performed for the plaintiff's condition or if all others 
had been unsuccessful, the plaintiff's only remedy would be in 
the Arata approach or under strict liability. 
E. Strict Liability in Health Care 
The Arata126 case suggests that a plaintiff seeking recovery 
for denied bone marrow transplantation coverage plead a cause 
of action in strict liability. Strict liability concepts, although 
rooted in the implied warranty doctrine of sales contracts, have 
been widely applied by the courts. Although most frequently 
utilized in products liability applications and sales contracts, the 
principles of strict liability have also been applied to other types 
of transactions. In Holmes Packaging Mach. Corp. v. Bing-
ham,us implied warranty was held applicable to bailment con-
tracts. The courts in California have distinguished contracts for 
services from contracts for goods and labor. "[T]he well settled 
rule in California is that where the primary objective of a trans-
action is to obtain services, the doctrines of implied warranty 
and strict liability do not apply."127 Strict liability has been de-
nied for various contracts for professional services.128 
Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing CO.129 provides a founda-
tion for extension of strict liability to insurance contracts. Aced 
involved a suit by a general contractor against a subcontractor 
(by cross-complaint), seeking damages for a faulty heating sys-
tem which leaked after installation. The California Supreme 
Court held that even absent the statutory law applicable to sales 
contracts, "similar warranties may be implied in other contracts 
not governed by such statutory provisions when the contracts 
are of such a nature that the implication is justified."lso The 
court applied the doctrine of strict liability in Pollard v. Saxe 
125. 50 Cal. App. 3d 821, 123 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1975). 
126. 252 Cal. App. 2d 862, 60 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967). 
127. Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Associates, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 855,102 
Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972). 
128. See Roberts v. Karr, 178 Cal. App. 2d 535, 3 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960) (surveyor 
services); Gautier v. General Telephone Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 302, 44 Cal. Rptr. 404 
(1965) (communications services); Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 
109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973) (blood transfusion). 
129. 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961). 
130. [d. at 582, 360 P.2d at 902, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (emphasis added). 
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and Yolles Dev. Co. to real property construction contracts. l3l In 
so doing, the court restated the policy considerations underlying 
the doctrine of implied warranty in sales contracts and found 
similar policy considerations in construction contracts. "The 
doctrine of implied warranty in a sales contract is based on the 
actual and presumed knowledge of the seller, reliance on the 
seller's skill or judgment, and the ordinary expectations of the 
parties. "132 Taken together, Aced and Pollard suggest that the 
court is willing to extend strict liability when there are sufficient 
parallels with the policy considerations reiterated in Pollard to 
"justify" extension. In a health insurance contract, the pur-
chaser is faced with a seller of superior knowledge on which the 
purchaser must rely to achieve his ordinary expectation that . 
should be become sick, the economic costs will be insured. At 
issue in any attempt to extend the doctrine of strict liability to 
health insurance contracts would be the nature of the contract. 
The insurer would try to characterize the transaction as one 
having the primary objective of obtaining health care and, 
thereby, bring it within the language of Allied Properties.133 Al-
lied Properties l3.f involved the professional services of a marine 
engineer in the structural design of a pier. In declining to find 
strict liability the court reasoned that "the general rule is . . . 
that those who sell their services for the guidance of others in 
their economic, financial, and personal affairs"136 are not liable 
absent negligence or intentional misconduct. 
In a health insurance contract, the service sought is risk-
spreading - there is no element of guidance. When the insured 
enters the contract he or she is not seeking health care, but 
rather assurance that should such care become necessary, eco-
nomic disruption will not result. Holding health-care insurers 
strictly liable on the theory of an implied warranty of suitability 
for a particular purpose would be a logical extension of the law. 
The non-parity of knowledge and bargaining power of the par-
ties suggest that overreaching would be as likely here as in a 
131. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 
648 (1974). 
132. [d. at 379, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651. 
133. Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Associates, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 855, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972). 
134. [d. 
135. Allied, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (emphasis added). 
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sales contract. The ordinary expectation of the insured is that 
his medical bills will be paid. A court in California might well 
hold that these conditions could make the contract "of such a 
nature that the implication"1S6 of implied warranty is justified .. 
A characterization by the courts of an insurance transaction 
as one primarily for services would not necessarily bar recovery 
in strict liability. The courts in California have found that con-
tracts for professional services do not have an implied war-
ranty.IS7 Although the contract itself is fiscal and, as analyzed 
above, has the characteristics which justify strict liability, the 
entire transaction could conceivably be characterized as aimed 
at assuring access to medical care. A strong argument could be 
made, buttressed by the inability of the plaintiff to obtain bone 
marrow transplantation without funding, that the insured in-
tended to obtain medical care (albeit a need which had not yet 
and might never arise) when he or she contracted with the 
health insurer. This apparently plaintiff-oriented argument 
would have, in California, the paradoxical result of at once stat-
ing the equitable principles underlying recovery in strict liability 
and, at the same time, deny that recovery. A court seeking to 
indemnify the bone marrow transplant candidate might be will-
ing to extend strict liability while viewing the transaction as one 
intended to obtain medical services. Although this would be a 
case of first impression in California, courts in Texas have ex-
tended strict liability directly to health care providers. ls8 
VI. POLITICAL REFORM 
A. Catastrophic Health Insurance 
While the courts are uniquely suited to provide remedies for 
individual plaintiffs wrongly denied access to bone marrow 
transplantation (or any other medical technology), the case by 
136. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 582, 360 P.2d 897, 902, 12 
Cal. Rptr. 257, 262 (1961). 
137. Allied, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259. 
138. Providence Hospital v. Truly, 611 S.W. 2d 127 (1980). In Truly, the appellate 
court upheld a jury verdict finding a hospital liable to a patient under a breach of war-
ranty action for the intraoperative injection of a contaminated drug. 
In Thomas v. St. Joseph's Hospital, the plaintiff was severely burned when his hos-
pital gown was ignited by a lighted match he had dropped. The appellate court found 
that a hospital could be held liable in strict liability for supplying a defective gown and 
remanded the issue to the trial court. 618 S.W. 2d 791 (1981). 
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case adjudication of what procedure is or is not experimental, 
and thereby, is or is not covered by the third-party payer, is 
probably not the best way to assess medical technology. This is 
especially true when one contemplates that decisions made on 
the basis of strict liability or adhesion contract principles do not 
address the validity of the technology or its application. Fur-
thermore,. access to legal resolution is not without denial. Fi-
nally, the pyrrhic legal victory that flows to the bereaved is not 
restitution. 
These considerations have led some commentators to call 
for catastrophic health insurance.139 Generally, proponents of 
catastrophic health insurance have in mind an economically de-
fined catastrophic illness. l4O Thus, an immediately fatal illness 
which would incur few medical bills would not be included 
within the definition of a catastrophic illness. Although politi-
cians emphasize that such plans would provide coverage for the 
poor, they are also capable of being incorporated into existing 
insurance systems by mandating that the employers cover em-
ployees with a plan meeting minimum standards.l4l The eco-
nomic problems of such plans are beyond the scope of this arti-
cle; suffice it to say that budgetary demands would require 
limits. Those limits would have to have a rational basis if the 
ethical concerns that spawned the concept of catastrophic health 
insurance were to be maintained. 
The only rational basis for coverage decision would be to 
fund all medically necessary treatments which were not experi-
mental or investigational (presuming the definition of cata-
strophic illness). The decision then would involve the definition 
of the very words which determine coverage under current third-
party decisions. lu Although one might expect a federally funded 
insurance program with a broad legislative mandate to construe 
the requirement of medical necessity widely and the experimen-
tal exclusion narrowly, the experience with bone marrow trans-
139. Havighurst, Strategies in Underwriting the Cost of Catastrophic Disease, 40 
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 122 (1976). 
140. Id. 
141. See generally, Note, Catastrophic Health Insurance and Cost Containment: 
Restructuring the Current Health Insurance System, 6 AM. JOUR. LAW & MED. 83 
(1980). 
142. See discussion of statutes and exclusionary clauses supra, pages 228-31. 
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plantation does not support that supposition. Of the major 
third-party payers, Medi-Cal covers bone marrow transplanta-
tion for the fewest indications. California Children's Services 
(CCS), with its requirement that the family have an adjusted 
gross income of less than $40,000,143 comes very close to cata-
strophic health insurance in design and operation. It is interest-
ing to note that, although using the same criteria for coverage 
decisions as Medi-Cal, CCS covers bone marrow transplantation 
for many more indications. One 'presumes that this coverage 
arises out of empathy for children and not the advocacy skills of 
physicians and lawyers working with higher income families. 
In spite of the admirable goals of catastrophic health insur-
ance, fiscal realities and ethical imperatives dictate that cover-
age decisions would have to be made. The risk-spreading aim of 
insurance is to spread costs over large segments of the popula-
tion - not to spread the risk of experimental procedures to all 
segments of the population. 
B. Medical Technology Assessment 
Current practices by third-party payers may result in varia-
ble or denied coverage. Judicial remedies, if sought after denial 
of access, are inadequate. Furthermore, judicial remedies, if re-
lied on to make social change, could have untoward results. 
Courts might give individual plaintiffs declaratory relief.H4 This 
relief would have to be founded on adhesion contract or strict 
liability principles and would thus, in effect, adjudicate a finding 
of "safe and efficacious" without the necessary scientific evalua-
tion. Because of cost constraints, catastrophic health insurance 
could not, and should not, cover any application of medical 
technology without an administrative determination of the 
safety and efficacy of the treatment. 
Individual plaintiffs denied access to bone marrow trans-
plantation will, and often should, seek legal remedy. Irrespective 
of any societal developments, plaintiffs will continue to find 
themselves with an illness for which bone marrow transplanta-
tion, for example, has been recommended by a physician and 
143. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 255 (West 1980). 
144. This, of course, presumes that the disease being proposed has a predictable 
natural history which progresses slowly enough to allow declaratory relief. 
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denied third-party coverage. There will always be indications 
undergoing evaluation, the efficacy of which will lie somewhere 
along the continuum from unknown to proven. Unfortunately, 
there will also always be the technologies whose place along the 
continuum depends on how one defines the endpoint. The great 
majority of medical technologies, accepted by physicians, pa-
tients and third-party payers alike, have not been proven to be 
safe and efficacious by rigorous application of the scientific 
method.14~ Therefore, if one uses the "standard of practice" or 
"generally medically accepted" definitions, these procedures are 
proven. If one uses the "safe and efficacious" definition, these 
procedures are not proven. 
With the rapid development of medical technology, some 
sort of formal mechanism for assessing medical technology 
seems imperative. The National Center for Health Care Tech-
nology (NCHCT) was established in 1978146 for that purpose. 
The National Council on Health Care Technology was estab-
lished by the same law to act as an advisory body.147 It was 
made up of eighteen members, including six scientists, two phy-
sicians, two hospital administrators, two lawyers, one ethicist 
and three persons from the general public.14s The NCHCT was 
not funded for 1982 and thereby ceased to exist. 149 Although the 
agency did not fund the basic research, it collected available 
data on a particular technology, made recommendations for the 
generation of new data if it was needed, and sought a consensus 
concerning the particular technology. The results of the assess-
ment were then published.l~o 
The establishment of a private institute to evaluate new 
technologies has been proposed. l6l The intent is for this Insti-
tute for Health-Care Evaluation (IHCE) to be composed of 
groups representing a broad cross-section of health-care inter-
145. Lashof, supra, note 116, at 39. 
146. Health Services Research Health Statistics, and Health Care Technology Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-623, 92 Stat. 3443 (1979) [hereinafter cited as N.C.H.C.T.]. 
147. Perry, The Brief Life of the National Center for Health Care Technology, 307 
N. ENGL. J. MED. 1095 (1982). 
148. [d. 
149. [d. 
150. N.C.H.C.T., Technology Assessment Forum, Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 
246 J.A.M.A. 1645 (1981). 
151. Bunker, supra, note 115. 
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ests. Technology assessment would be one of the goals of IHCE. 
The proponents of an IHCE envision it as a non-profit corpora-
tion which would assume some of the functions of the former 
National Center for Health Care Technology. Because the insur-
ers would benefit from having a formal non-interested group 
provide guidelines for coverage decisions on new technologies, 
they might be expected to at least partially fund the 
organization. 
The organization would not necessarily do any research on 
its own. It would, however, be hoped that by collecting and ana-
lyzing data as it is generated by major centers, the institute 
could make recommendations concerning where along the con-
tinuum of evaluation that a medical technology lies. This would 
serve not only to assist third-party payers in deciding when or 
whether to cover· new technologies, but would identify areas 
where more research is needed before a technology can be con-
sidered not investigational. The argument that there is a need 
for scientific evaluation of new medical technology was devel-
oped extensively above through the vehicle of tracing the indica-
tions for bone marrow transplantation. There are, unfortunately, 
several recognized problems with the development of a private 
institute for health care evaluation. 1112 
At the outset, although the institute would have no official 
regulatory functions, its recommendations would be strongly 
probative in a courtroom. Consequently, third-party payers, 
whether private or government, may be less than enthusiastic 
about supporting such an institute - fearing that coverage deci-
sions would in effect be taken from them. The Royal Drug 
caseU13 raises serious concerns about whether such an institute 
would be open to an antitrust action. It is uncertain whether a 
court would consider such activities risk-spreading and thus up-
hold a McCarran-Ferguson defense,1II4 or find them aimed at 
risk-reducing. The concerted action element would be manifestly 
present. 
152. See generally, id. 
153. Group Life Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205 (1979), discussed supra 
at pages 238-39. 
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976). 
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The current publicity concerning children denied bone mar-
row transplantation on the basis of a coverage decision has re-
sulted in demands for a political solution.11111 The solution gener-
ally sought is a funding guarantee for procedures which are not 
covered by third-party payers because they are considered ex-
perimental. As the discussion of catastrophic health insurance 
demonstrates, this "political solution" would still require some 
decision as to which procedures are experimental and which are 
not. This coverage decision is mandated from both ethical and 
fiscal considerations so that no degree of cost-shifting can obvi-
ate the need to make such a decision. On the other hand, the 
concept of a private institute to evaluate new technologies is an 
alluring one. It squarely faces the necessity of evaluating new 
technologies for efficacy and the moral imperative that coverage 
availability (and thereby, actual availability for an expensive 
procedure such as bone marrow transplantation) not depend on 
which third-party payer the insured selects or must accept. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Access to medical technology is currently being denied 
many patients. In the instance of bone marrow transplantation, 
where all the indications have a fatal outcome if not trans-
planted, the case for a thorough evaluation is manifest. 
The presumption is that if a physician recommends a bone 
marrow transplantation, and a transplant center is willing to 
perform it, that any denial of access based on a coverage deter-
mination is an affront to justice. This presumption is based on a 
further presumption that the treatment is efficacious. This de-
termination of efficacy, however, is rarely made on the basis of 
the scientific method when new medical technologies are under 
development, resulting in technologies being applied enthusiasti-
cally by medical innovators without any demonstration of effi-
cacy. At this stage in the development of a new technology, ex-
perts may disagree about the indication for application of a 
technology such as bone marrow transplantation. "Experts usu-
ally disagree not so much about the objectively verifiable facts, 
but about the inferences that can be drawn form the facts. mile A 
155. See supra, p. 233. (Parents' Action for Children's Cancer Treatment, for 
example). 
156. Bazelon, supra, note 2, at 827. 
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patient who has an illness which can be treated with bone mar-
row transplantation, who has exhausted other medical treat-
ment, will very likely have a bone marrow transplantation rec-
ommended by his or her physician. Coverage is equally likely to 
be denied by the third-party payer on the basis that the applica-
tion is investigational. Such a patient's denial of access is 
amendable to legal resolution. A court would probably find for 
the plaintiff on the basis of strict liability or adhesion contract 
principles. If declaratory relief were given, the remedy would be 
legally adequate. The real dilemma is whether a bone marrow 
transplant is in the patient's best interest. 
[We] are all becoming increasingly conscious of 
the extent to which many supposedly scientific or 
technical decisions involve painful value choices, 
and pose difficult policy problems. We have come 
to realize that virtually every technological inno-
vation may carry unwanted consequences, and 
that technological progress may therefore cause, 
as well as solve, critical societal problems. U7 
This warning applies to the patient who may be harmed by the 
unproven therapy in attempts to offer him or her every treat-
ment that might be effective. It is equally applicable to society 
in general. Because of fiscal limitations which are finite regard-
less of politicized budgetary philosophies, "purchase of care 
which is ineffective or of undocumented efficacy for some pa-
tients will almost certainly result in a failure to provide effective 
care to other patients. II1OB 
The need is for critical scientific assessment of medical 
technologies to allow third-party payers, referring physicians 
and patients to make rational decisions. Many applications of 
new technologies, such as bone marrow transplantation for in-
fantile osteopetrosis, will never be undertaken in sufficient num-
bers to allow rigid statistical validation. Whatever body evalu-
ates such applications will have to retain a "generally accepted" 
standard in the evaluation process if ethical decisions are to be 
made. 
The concept of a private institute for medical technology 
157. [d. at 819. 
158. Bunker, supra note 115, at 691. 
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evaluation has much to recommend it. It would require more co-
operation amongst health-insurers, medical institutions and gov-
ernmental agencies than has been seen in the past. It remains to 
be seen whether the crises of rapidly expanding, inadequately 
evaluated medical technology can foster such cooperation. 
By whatever method medical technology is distributed, the 
legal system will retain a role. The individual plaintiff who needs 
a bone marrow transplant for an indication not proveneffica-
cious will always need to seek legal redress regardless of how the 
technology assessment was made. Courts, in their scrutiny, can 
do much to assure that the decision-making process is rational. 
The striking similarity of coverage and exclusion determinations 
for bone marrow transplantation by third-party payers suggests 
that these determinations have been made on a rational basis to 
date. The pressing need is for critical scientific evaluation of new 
applications of bone marrow transplantation and other technolo-
gies as they emerge. 
Lee S. Wilkinson, M.D. * 
* Third-year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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